

Strategic Studies Institute **SSI**

PANDORA'S BOX REOPENED:

Ethnic Conflict in Europe
and Its Implications

William T. Johnsen

19950301 048

U.S. Army War College



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE Dec 23, 1994	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Final Report		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Pandora's Box Reopened: Ethnic Conflict in Europe and Its Implications (U)		5. FUNDING NUMBERS		
6. AUTHOR(S) William T. Johnsen		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER ACN 94042		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE		
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) The author explores the complexities of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Europe, and assesses the substantial consequences for the United States. He examines the causes and sources of ethnic conflict, and then analyzes its complex nature: its spectrum, patterns, and special characteristics. The author next investigates the policymaking process, especially the difficulties confronting decisionmakers as they grapple with the unique nature of ethnic conflict. He then assesses the implications of ethnic conflict in Europe for the United States and the U.S. Army. Finally, he offers policy recommendations that might assist political and military leaders in developing U.S. policies for resolving ethnic conflict in Europe.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Europe; ethnic conflict; national interests; strategic objectives; secessionist movements; terrorism; preventive diplomacy		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 105		16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

The Report Documentation Page (RDP) is used in announcing and cataloging reports. It is important that this information be consistent with the rest of the report, particularly the cover and title page. Instructions for filling in each block of the form follow. It is important to *stay within the lines* to meet optical scanning requirements.

Block 1. Agency Use Only (Leave Blank).

Block 2. Report Date. Full publication date including day, month, and year, if available (e.g. 1 Jan 88). Must cite at least the year.

Block 3. Type of Report and Dates Covered. State whether report is interim, final, etc. If applicable, enter inclusive report dates (e.g. 10 Jun 87 - 30 Jun 87).

Block 4. Title and Subtitle. A title is taken from the part of the report that provides the most meaningful and complete information. When a report is prepared in more than one volume, repeat the primary title, add volume number, and include subtitle for the specific volume. On classified documents enter the title classification in parentheses.

Block 5. Funding Numbers. To include contract and grant numbers; may include program element number(s), project number(s), task number(s), and work unit number(s). Use the following labels:

C - Contract	PL - Project
G - Grant	TA - Task
PE - Program Element	WU - Work Unit Accession No.

Block 6. Author(s). Name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. If editor or compiler, this should follow the name(s).

Block 7. Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es). Self-explanatory.

Block 8. Performing Organization Report Number. Enter the unique alphanumeric report number(s) assigned by the organization performing the report.

Block 9. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es). Self-explanatory.

Block 10. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Report Number. (If known)

Block 11. Supplementary Notes. Enter information not included elsewhere such as: Prepared in cooperation with...; Trans. of...; To be published in... When a report is revised, include a statement whether the new report supersedes or supplements the older report.

Block 12a. Distribution/Availability Statement. Denotes public availability or limitations. Cite any availability to the public. Enter additional limitations or special markings in all capitals (e.g. NOFORN, REL, ITAR).

DOD - See DoDD 5230.24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents."

DOE - See authorities.

NASA - See Handbook NHB 2200.2.

NTIS - Leave blank.

Block 12b. Distribution Code.

DOD - Leave blank.

DOE - Enter DOE distribution categories from the Standard Distribution for Unclassified Scientific and Technical Reports.

NASA - Leave blank.

NTIS - Leave blank.

Block 13. Abstract. Include a brief (*Maximum 200 words*) factual summary of the most significant information contained in the report.

Block 14. Subject Terms. Keywords or phrases identifying major subjects in the report.

Block 15. Number of Pages. Enter the total number of pages.

Block 16. Price Code. Enter appropriate price code (*NTIS only*).

Blocks 17 - 19. Security Classifications. Self-explanatory. Enter U.S. Security Classification in accordance with U.S. Security Regulations (i.e., UNCLASSIFIED). If form contains classified information, stamp classification on the top and bottom of the page.

Block 20. Limitation of Abstract. This block must be completed to assign a limitation to the abstract. Enter either UL (unlimited) or SAR (same as report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited. If blank, the abstract is assumed to be unlimited.

**PANDORA'S BOX REOPENED:
ETHNIC CONFLICT IN EUROPE
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS**

William T. Johnsen

December 23, 1994

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The author wishes to thank his Strategic Studies Institute colleagues: Dr. Stephen Blank, Dr. Steven Metz, and Dr. Thomas-Durell Young for their helpful critique of early drafts of this report. Special thanks go to Dr. Jacob Kipp of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS and Colonel (ret.) James McCallum of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, U.S. Army War College for their insights and constructive criticism. The author, alone, remains responsible for the opinions expressed in this report.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed directly to the author at the same address, or by telephone: commercial (717)245-4076 or DSN 242-4076.

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

CONTENTS

FOREWORD	v
KEY JUDGEMENTS.....	vii
THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN EUROPE	1
PURPOSE	3
THE IMPORTANCE OF ETHNIC IDENTITY	3
HISTORICAL SOURCES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN EUROPE	6
PROXIMATE CAUSES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT	9
THE SPECTRUM OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN EUROPE	13
PATTERNS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT	15
SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT	18
CRAFTING POLICY: EASIER SAID THAN DONE	22
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS	39
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY	44
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	55
ENDNOTES	61
APPENDIX A. ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS ANIMOSITIES IN EUROPE AND POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE	81
APPENDIX B. SIGNIFICANT ETHNIC MINORITIES IN EUROPE.....	85
ABOUT THE AUTHOR.....	89

KEY JUDGEMENTS

Given vital U.S. national interest in a stable and peaceful Europe, the United States will remain engaged in European affairs. Because a particular ethnic conflict may place U.S. interests at risk, the United States will continue to be concerned about the prevention and resolution of ethnic violence in Europe. The key questions for policymakers surround whether, why, and how the United States might choose to become involved.

TO INTERVENE OR NOT TO INTERVENE?

Before intervening in an ethnic crisis, policymakers must consider several key points. First, the United States may be drawn more deeply into a conflict than is merited by immediate threats to U.S. interests. This can result in national prestige, energies, and resources, and especially lives, being expended out of proportion to the original risks to U.S. interests. Second, policymakers must possess the political will to carry out the coercive use of military force, if need be. Empty threats only encourage recalcitrant behavior or reinforce the perception that belligerents can simply outwait the United States. Repercussions could extend beyond an ongoing crisis, and lead other groups or states to conclude that the United States lacks the national will to support its policies. Third, if policymakers contemplate the use of military force, they must recognize that ethnic conflicts tend to be prolonged, lasting decades or generations. Given the American public's historical desire to apply overwhelming force to achieve rapid and decisive victory, public support for U.S. engagement in an ethnic conflict may be difficult to sustain. *Before* committing U.S. forces, therefore, policymakers must assess whether the national will can be sustained to ensure that resources and lives are not expended without a commensurate opportunity for success.

Finally, while the consequences of intervening in ethnic conflict may be considerable, abstaining from a crisis is not risk free. First, ethnic conflicts have considerable potential to destabilize emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. Second, if U.S. interests may lead to eventual involvement, these interests may be better served through early rather than later intervention. Lastly, should America stand aside from an ethnic conflict, Europeans may perceive that the United States is abrogating its leadership responsibilities, thereby eroding U.S. influence in this major region of the world.

WHY?—STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

If officials decide to intervene in an ethnic crisis, they must first clearly articulate how the conflict endangers U.S. interests. Based on this assessment, they must next identify U.S. objectives. In doing so, they must establish the limits of what the United States is *willing* to do to resolve a particular situation. Political leaders then must establish clear, achievable political objectives (e.g., physically contain the conflict within existing borders, interpose forces between belligerents, undertake peace-enforcement operations, or protect the distribution of humanitarian assistance) that permit the development of military objectives, plans, and operations to accomplish those political goals. Finally, officials must identify political, military, or economic measures of effectiveness that can be used to assess progress toward attaining those goals.

HOW?—STRATEGIC OPTIONS

Before addressing the specifics of strategic options to address an ethnic crisis, three general points require emphasis:

- The concept of ethnic identity will permeate every ethnic crisis. Policymakers must never forget that ethnic identity is important to Europeans, so important that many people are willing to kill or to die to protect it.

- Each conflict will have a different point of origin, evolution, and historical context. Each will present unique strategic risks, will require a different intervention strategy, and will have distinct potentials for success. Therefore every ethnic crisis will require an equally unique solution that reflects its specific context. Cookie-cutter solutions will not work.
- Historical currents of ethnic conflict run deep and do not lend themselves to quick or simplistic solutions. The fact that 50 years of harsh authoritarian or Communist rule failed to root out ethnic or nationalist tendencies in Central and Eastern Europe should serve as a warning to policymakers anticipating rapid resolution of ethnic tensions that have festered for centuries.

U.S. efforts in resolving an ethnic crisis should focus on proactive policies that ease tensions before they escalate into violence. If conflict occurs, the United States, in conjunction with its European allies, must integrate all elements of national power (political, economic, diplomatic, psychological, and military) to craft policies that resolve, or at least contain, conflicts before they adversely affect regional stability.

Decisionmakers must recognize that while political, diplomatic, and economic options are preferred, frequently they possess limited utility. While this circumstance is regrettable, it reflects the reality of ethnic politics and conflict where participants tend to view events in zero sum game terms. Policymakers should be prepared, therefore, to implement military options that complement other alternatives. *Prior to committing military force, however, policymakers need to consider the following key questions:*

- Is there a threat to regional or international peace and security?
- What are the desired political objectives to be achieved?
- What is the desired end state?
- Have viable alternatives to the use of military forces been pursued?

- What are the appropriate military ends, ways, and means to achieve the political objectives?
- How long and to what extent is the United States willing to commit forces to the region?
- Will the American public continue to support such a commitment if it includes the prolonged deployment of ground forces?
- Is the United States willing to engage sufficient forces to achieve decisive military and political results?
- Are the political objectives in balance with the potential expenditure of national treasure and lives?

If these questions cannot be answered adequately, U.S. forces should not be employed.

Equally important, policymakers must understand that military power, alone, will not solve the underlying societal, political, or economic sources of conflict. Military power must be integrated with the other elements of national power in a coherent manner that supports U.S. national interests. If close synchronization of policy and military operations does not occur, an internal strategic cleavage is likely to develop, with confused policy the result. Preventing such an outcome will require U.S. policymakers to have a clear vision of the political ends that they want the military to pursue. Moreover, these issues will require continuous reexamination throughout the employment of U.S. forces to ensure the continued coincidence of U.S. national policies and the military means to achieve them.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Planning.

Planning frequently will have to be accomplished in an ambiguous environment. Crises will arrive quickly and require a rapid response, often in the absence of coalition consensus or complete U.S. political guidance. But, the United States cannot afford improvised responses to crises. To prevent "ad

hocery," the United States must develop a sound and rigorous policymaking apparatus and process, and adhere to it. The inter-agency process must be made to work routinely in an effective manner. This organization and process must ensure the coherency of policies and assure that one policy initiative does not conflict with other U.S.-European policies or relations.

Developing initiatives will be possible only if the U.S. policymaking apparatus possesses a detailed working knowledge of Europe's regions; their history, culture, and ethnic composition; and the ethnic fracture lines that divide societies. Without such information, policies and efforts to implement them could be ineffective, or exacerbate an already volatile situation.

Finally, analysts must prepare *now* for the next crisis. They must identify potential ethnic fracture zones, conduct risk analyses, and develop and assess potential policy options.

Resources.

The United States does not have the resources to do everything, everywhere, every time. As part of their planning, therefore, policymakers must establish priorities for U.S. action. Precluding the spread of the ongoing war in Yugoslavia and peacefully resolving that conflict ranks high. Stability in the emerging democracies of Central Europe is another major interest. Preventing ethnically based conflict in the European portions of the former Soviet Union, particularly Ukraine and Russia, is also in U.S. national interests.

Failure to fund adequately U.S. military participation will obviously have repercussions for the success or failure of U.S. policy in a conflict. Failure to fund peace operations may adversely affect the ability of the U.S. military to execute other, more far-reaching policies, such as the existing national strategy that calls for the ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. Funding must also occur in a timely manner to preclude short-term funding shortfalls that lead to a long-term decline in readiness. Political leaders must ensure that missions and resources remain in

balance, or the nation runs the risk of "overstressing" the military and creating a "hollow" force.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

Force Design and Mix.

In its deliberations over Force XXI, the Army needs to consider closely the requirements of peace operations. Specifically, the Army needs to examine whether it needs to alter its current mix of Active Component combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Or, should the Army place greater reliance on the combat support and combat service support capabilities of the Reserve Components? What legislative relief may be necessary to obtain greater access to Reserve Component units? Alternatively, what innovative options could be pursued within the limits of the existing legislation?

Doctrine.

Ongoing efforts at developing doctrine for peace operations are an excellent beginning. Two key points deserve special attention:

- The Army must emphasize the application of current warfighting doctrine to the conduct of peace operations: i.e., establishing a theater of operations, developing a theater campaign plan that links military operations to national strategy and policies, carrying out intelligence preparation of the area of operations, and applying the operational art.
- Planning for peace operations should follow a process similar to planning for combat operations: perform a mission analysis; conduct a commander's and staff estimate of the situation; develop the commander's concept of operations and intent; prepare, approve, and distribute plans and orders; execute operations; and supervise. During the conduct of peace operations, iterative reassessments need to be carried out to ensure

that plans continue to conform to policy and operational requirements.

Training.

Because peace operations can escalate rapidly into combat, training must focus on the combat skills necessary to prevail upon the battlefield. But, peace operations—even peace enforcement missions—may require *combat skills different* from those needed to meet a mechanized onslaught. Continued efforts must be devoted to *specific training* to prepare units for the transition from a focus on combat to peace operations. Equally important, training strategies and plans to assist units in the transition from peace operations to full warfighting capabilities need to be refined. Finally, the Army needs to think more about how to transition U.S. forces from national or a U.S.-led coalition command to control by a multinational headquarters.

Required Army Capabilities.

Meeting the demanding requirements of ethnic conflict in Europe will necessitate that the U.S. Army possess a number of capabilities:

- Full participation in the JCS and inter-agency policy development process. This implies that the Army must have the necessary personnel in appropriate positions with the requisite knowledge and skills (both bureaucratic and regional expertise) for effective participation in these fora. This includes not only the Army Staff, but also Army personnel on the Joint Staff, within the inter-agency process, and on the staffs of the unified commands.
- A trained and ready force, prepared for short-notice, worldwide deployment, across a broad spectrum of combat missions, peace operations, and Operations Other Than War.
- A forward presence in Europe that can reassure, deter, contain and, if necessary, intervene in ethnic crises.

- Army forces must be capable of integrating into multinational force structures, as well as ad hoc organizations. Units must be able to interface with nongovernment organizations.
- A force structure and force design that provides sufficient numbers of forces to operate across a broad spectrum of operations in peacetime, crisis, and war, and the flexibility to operate in all three environments simultaneously. For example,
 - Adequate numbers of specialized combat support and combat service support units and personnel (e.g., special operations forces, engineers, military police, civil affairs, psychological operations) to avoid overstressing limited resources.
 - Combat support and combat service support force structure capable of supporting sustained peace operations, while concurrently supporting a limited lesser regional contingency.
 - Sufficient combat support and combat service support capacity to transfer forces from peace operations to full scale combat operations, while supporting the movement of forces to a major regional contingency.
- Sufficient forces to meet anticipated peace operations missions, while maintaining the ability to execute one Major Regional Contingency (MRC) and one Lesser Regional Contingency (LRC). These forces must also be able to conduct multiple concurrent peace operations, as well as rotate forces involved in protracted peace operations. This will require increased access to the Reserve Components.
- A detailed understanding of Europe, its regions, cultures, ethnic composition, historical circumstances and contemporary contentious issues, as well as an understanding of ethnicity, ethnonationalism, ethnic conflict, and how these issues can adversely affect stability in Europe. This will require the Army to revitalize

and sustain its Foreign Area Officer program, with particular attention devoted to the newly independent nations of the former Soviet Union.

- A leader development program, that ensures:
 - At the strategic level, the ability to assist in the formulation and execution of national policy, and the development of military strategic plans to implement policy.
 - At the operational level, the ability to develop, plan and execute military operations, whether combat, peace, or other than war, to achieve national objectives.
 - The requisite negotiating skills to participate in crisis management, to act as an intermediary between sides of a conflict, or to serve as an interface between the U.S. military and nongovernment and private volunteer organizations (NGOs/PVOs).

CONCLUSION

While U.S. participation in ethnic conflicts in Europe is fraught with considerable difficulties and dangers, U.S. interests may drive the United States into engaging in such ventures. When preparing to participate in efforts to resolve ethnic conflict, whether politically or militarily, the best that U.S. policymakers can probably hope to accomplish is to:

- Recognize where ethnic conflict may arise in Europe.
- Establish what, if any, U.S. interests are at stake.
- Assess the importance of those interests versus potential expenditure of American lives and national treasure.
- Identify steps or policies that might deter violence.
- Build coalitions to implement policies.

- Contain the violence and achieve conflict termination at the earliest opportunity if violence occurs.
- Devise policy options that integrate the political, diplomatic, economic, and military elements of national power and that redress the underlying political, economic and societal sources of the conflict.
- Recognize the limits of the United States and its allies, and understand that, occasionally, there may be little that outside intervention in an ethnic crisis or conflict can accomplish.

PANDORA'S BOX REOPENED: ETHNIC CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS¹

THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN EUROPE

Although the constraints of the cold war offered a brief respite from Europe's long history of ethnically related violence, ". . . [ethnicity] has now become the ultimate resort of the politically desperate."² As a result, ethnic conflict in Europe has returned with a vengeance. Evidenced most obviously by events in the former Yugoslavia—particularly the murderous civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina—ethnically based conflict once again threatens to engulf the Balkans. The implosion of the Soviet Union has resulted in widespread ethnic violence in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. And, importantly, the breakup of the Soviet empire has unleashed ethnically motivated nationalism in Eastern Europe that could destabilize the continent.³

Despite a lesser likelihood of violence, longstanding ethnic problems (e.g., Sudeten Germans, Hungarian minorities [Romania, Slovak Republic, Vojvodina region of Serbia, Ukraine], and traditional Russo-Polish or Polish-German rivalries) once again could subject Central Europe to outbursts of strife. Nor is Western Europe immune, as low level ethnic violence has simmered in several states for decades: e.g., Basque, Catalan, and Corsican separatists, and sectarian violence in Northern Ireland.

U.S. policymakers must understand that the current level of ethnic conflict represents only the tip of a potential iceberg.⁴ (Appendix A contains an overview of ongoing and potential ethnic conflicts in Europe.) The question that confronts U.S. policymakers, therefore, is whether the United States should be concerned with ethnically motivated violence in Europe? The answer is straightforward. While ethnic turmoil in Europe

does not directly threaten vital U.S. interests, conflict in a particular state or region may imperil major interests and draw in the United States.⁵ Alternatively, an aggregate of "minor" ethnic conflicts could adversely affect U.S. interests in the region, inducing a U.S. response, or support for an ally or friend could draw the United States into an ethnic conflict. Further, many Americans are generally distressed by the horrors of the world and have an almost compulsive reaction "to do something."⁶ Thus, even a peripheral interest might oblige U.S. action.

Moreover, the United States has a vital interest in ensuring a peaceful and stable Europe,⁷ and ethnic conflict potentially represents a significant threat to that goal. Normally, the United States would rely upon European states or organizations to address these issues, but few, if any, states or multinational organizations in Europe are prepared intellectually or institutionally to cope with these new conditions.⁸ Nor, apparently, do coalitions of European states, much less individual countries have the capacity or the will for decisive political, economic, or military action to settle ethnic conflicts in what are perceived to be distant areas. As a result, the United States may be compelled to take a leading role in creating collective security or defense arrangements to control ethnic violence.

The United States, therefore, will continue to participate in efforts to resolve ethnic conflict in Europe. U.S. endeavors must focus on proactive policies that ease tensions before they escalate into violence. Failing deterrence of ethnic violence, the United States, in conjunction with its European allies and friends, must devise policies that integrate all elements of national power (political, economic, diplomatic, psychologic, and military) to resolve, preferably, or at least contain conflicts before they adversely affect regional or continental stability. When vital or major national interests dictate, the United States must be prepared to intervene militarily.

PURPOSE


The key question is how to build coherent policies to resolve ethnic conflict and avoid the best-intended, but physically, psychologically, and fiscally enervating temptation to "do something!" To prepare the United States for future participation in resolving ethnic conflict, policymakers must close the gaps between U.S. culture and policies and the realities of ethnic conflict in Europe. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to help soldiers, policymakers, and statesmen discern the complexities of ethnic conflict in Europe. The study offers a brief explanation of the strategic significance of ethnic conflict in Europe. It next provides a primer on ethnicity, and then acquaints policymakers with the historical and proximate sources of ethnic conflict in Europe. The report next identifies and analyzes the spectrum, potential patterns, and special characteristics of ethnic conflict. The difficulties inherent in crafting policy options, to include strategic objectives and political and military concepts, are then addressed. The study next assesses the implications of ethnic conflict in Europe, with particular emphasis on the U.S. Army. Brief recommendations for policymakers and their advisors close the report.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

American political leaders and their advisors may not fully appreciate the importance of ethnic or national identity to many Europeans, particularly how this concept shapes national or ethnic group policies. Indeed, American policymakers may find ethnicity and ethnic identity alien concepts, outside their cultural context, that may hide or at least obscure, causes and potential solutions to ethnic conflict.⁹ But, understanding the concept of ethnic identity is the keystone to comprehending the complexities of an ethnic conflict that might involve the United States.¹⁰ Defining ethnic identity in practical terms is no easy task, however. James G. Kellas, long-time observer of nationalism and ethnic groups, defines *ethnicity* as "the state of being ethnic, or *belonging to an ethnic group*."¹¹ On the other hand, experts on ethnicity George De Vos and Anthony D. Smith define ethnic identity more in terms of *establishing and reinforcing the differences between groups*.¹²

These apparently divergent criteria establish two important points for understanding ethnic identity. First, a critical element of defining ethnic identity is determining *who cannot belong to the group*. Membership is posed in stark alternatives, with no room for compromise. Either you are like me or you are not like me. Second, ethnic identity usually is framed in a "zero sum game" context, where ethnic groups view a gain by another group as their loss. Compromise, therefore, is not viewed as a natural part of a political, economic, or cultural process, but as a sign of weakness. When carried to extremes, this argument can lead an ethnic group to perceive its very existence threatened over even the most minute issue.

As indicated in Figure 1, the primary ties that determine an individual's ethnic affiliation begin with kin relationships. The basic building block is the family which combines with other families to form a clan.¹³ The tribe, ". . . the largest social group defined *primarily in terms of kinship*, . . . is normally an aggregate of clans,"¹⁴ follows next in the ethnic hierarchy. While kin relationships form the core of ethnic identity, observers must consider additional attributes that contribute to



Core = Ethnic Identification

Outer Ring = Potential Sources of Integration and Assimilation or Division

Figure 1.

an ethnic identity. The difficulty lies in determining which traits do or do not apply to an ethnic group and why, as well as the complex interactions between attributes. Complicating this process is a lack of consensus on specific attributes, a range of potential traits, or the minimum number required to constitute ethnic identity. A given ethnic group, for example, might display only a few traits, but still have a well-established identity. Alternatively, another group might display many characteristics, but not possess a cohesive identity. Attributes that help define one ethnic group might not apply in another case, even though the groups appear remarkably similar.¹⁵ Conversely, two ethnic groups could share a wide number of attributes, but still view themselves as distinct, perhaps competing, ethnic identities.¹⁶

Race illustrates this challenge.¹⁷ On the one hand, race forms the *sine qua non* of German ethnic identity.¹⁸ On the other hand, while Croats, Muslims, and Serbs within the erstwhile Yugoslavia derive from common racial origins, each group uses differences in language (even though considered petty by outsiders), religion (Roman Catholic, Muslim, and Serbian Orthodox), and culture (Central European, Ottoman, and Byzantine) to constitute a distinct ethnic identity.¹⁹

Equally important for analysts to grasp is that, while an ethnic identity may coalesce around a collection of attributes, ethnics also use these traits to separate themselves from other groups. In this manner, attributes found in the center and outer rings of Figure 1 may have dual, but contradictory, influences. Two (or more) ethnic groups, for example, may identify with a particular territory. Rather than serving as a unifying trait, ethnic groups may compete for territorial control as they try to bring all their members within the borders of a single "nation-state."²⁰ At the same time, they may also exclude nonmembers from that same territory; setting the stage for "ethnic cleansing."²¹ Thus, the very traits that form the basis for an ethnic identity can be used to fracture a society along ethnic lines as the various ethnic subgroups use these characteristics to integrate themselves at the expense of others.

As the preceding discussion indicates, analysts face considerable challenges in coming to grips with the complexities of ethnic identity. In assessing ethnic identity and its influence, analysts must keep several key points in mind:

- Ethnic identity is important to Europeans, so important that many people are willing to kill or to die to protect it.
- While it is possible to generalize about the attributes that make up an ethnic group, *the circumstances contributing to the establishment of ethnic identity make each one unique.*
- To identify and assess the attributes that make up an ethnic identity require that analysts possess manifold talents and expertise; i.e., they must understand the general aspects of ethnicity and ethnic identity, as well as have a detailed knowledge of specific issues within regions or countries.

HISTORICAL SOURCES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN EUROPE

History plays a significant role in shaping ethnic identity.²² If officials are to craft effective policies that resolve ethnic issues, they must understand the historical origins of the conflict. The brief historical outline that follows offers readers a sense of the events—migrations, religion, imperial conquest and expansion, and nationalism—that sets the context for current ethnic conflict in Europe.

Since antiquity, massive migratory invasions emanating from Scandinavia, Asia, Africa, and modern day Russia washed over Europe in successive waves. The ebb and flow of centuries of warfare added to the massive movements of populations. As a result of these population shifts and physical geography, dissimilar ethnic groups, especially in Central, Southeastern, and Eastern Europe, found themselves neighbors.²³ (See Appendix B.)

Religion reinforced ethnic differences. Competition between Christianity and Islam began during the early 8th century, continued during the Crusades, and intensified during

the Ottoman occupation of the Balkans (14th-20th centuries). The gradual split between Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy (which later subdivided along ethnic lines: Russian, Greek, Serbian) resulted in the Great Schism of 1054 that divided Europe into contending religious groups. The spread of Protestant theology after 1517 further fanned the flames of religious animosity. The Peace of Augsburg (1555) that ended the first round of Protestant-Catholic wars, for example, provided that the religion of the ruler became that of the state; thus further fragmenting Europe.²⁴ Finally, the rising number of denominations within the major Protestant confessions increasingly splintered Western and Central Europe into competing religious and ethnic factions.²⁵

Concomitantly, a series of princes and kings began building ethnically convoluted empires: Holy Roman, Spanish, Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian. From the late-16th to the late-18th centuries, a sense of association with a specific monarchy and territory contributed to the rise of the nation-state in Europe (e.g., Britain, France, The Netherlands).²⁶ Since the French Revolution (1789), the desire of ethnic groups to gather all members within a single nation-state has led to the modern concept of nationalism.²⁷ Exploding from the tumult of the French and Napoleonic Revolutions, nationalism accelerated throughout the 19th century. Indeed, the revolutions of 1848; the unification of Italy (1861-70) and Germany (1864-71); and the rise of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania appeared to auger the triumph of nationalism.

But these achievements overshadowed the fact that eastern empires enjoyed varying levels of success in denying, coopting, or delaying nationalist movements.²⁸ And, despite ethnonational gains in Western Europe, neither the new states nor their earlier counterparts (Spain, France, Great Britain) were ethnically homogeneous. Nor did these new nation-states contain all peoples of a particular "nation." Great Power interests and politics frequently overrode nationalist ambitions as one or another of the major powers denied ethnic aspirations, or included an ethnic group in a state against its will.²⁹

Building ethnonationalist tensions at the turn of the century set the stage for World War I. One should recall that an ethnic issue sparked the conflagration, as Gavrilo Princip (a Bosnian Serb bent on joining Bosnia to Serbia) fired the shots that exploded the Balkan powder keg and set Europe aflame. After 4 years of war, revolution, and the violent demise of the great empires—Austro-Hungarian, German, Russian, and Ottoman—many groups hoped to settle ethnic issues in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe. But, the Versailles settlements³⁰ represent a host of lost opportunities. The peace treaties paid lip service to the idea of self-determination as Great Power interests once again dominated the outcome.³¹ Gross ignorance of geography and ethnic composition of regions resulted in states that failed to reflect either ethnic reality or ethnonational aspirations.³² Regional power imbalances led to a cobbling together of antagonistic ethnic groups, who sought unity only to stave off predatory powers with the likelihood that they would seek separation, if not divorce, at the earliest opportunity.³³ Finally, the treaties created irredentist states (e.g., Germany, Hungary, and Italy) eager to overturn the agreements.

In many ways, World War II represented an extension of historical ethnic animosities. Hitler's views on German ethnic superiority and the "German Question"³⁴ justified the *Anschluss* with Austria on the grounds of bringing all ethnic Germans into the Third Reich, and served as a pretext for his dismantlement of Czechoslovakia. The invasion of Poland was intended to return the Danzig Corridor, Eastern Prussia, and their ethnic German populations to the Reich. These actions served as the prelude for the invasion of Russia that would provide *Lebensraum* ("living room") and resources for ethnically superior Germans.³⁵ Lastly, the "Final Solution" would ensure the ethnic purity of the German race.³⁶

Nor was Hitler alone in his abuse of historical ethnic issues. Ethnic groups, especially in Central, Southeastern, and Eastern Europe, used the overarching violence of the war to settle old scores. While the examples are manifold, a number are pertinent to contemporary Europe: Croat vs. Serb vs. Muslim; Serb vs. Albanian; Bulgar vs. Greek and Macedonian;

Hungarian vs. Serb, Slovak, and Romanian; and Russian vs. any number of ethnic groups (Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Tatar, Moldovan, etc.), to name but a few.

Important for an understanding of current ethnic conflicts is the fact that the brutal ethnic violence of World War II is not the distant past. These events remain fresh in the memories of those who experienced these events, or in the minds of the current generation who heard in vivid detail grim horror stories from parents or grandparents. Frequently, therefore, victims have a face to put on this misery: another ethnic group that participated in or is perceived to be responsible for the crimes of World War II. Rather than resolving ethnic issues, therefore, the war oftentimes exacerbated ethnic animosities and frequently created new scores to be settled at some future date.

The Iron Curtain, ideological polarization, Moscow's tight control of its satellites, and totalitarian regimes throughout much of the eastern bloc precluded resolution of long-standing ethnic tensions after World War II. Indeed, pressures continued to build until the end of the cold war. The current spate of ethnic conflict, therefore, may be seen as a long-deferred extension of the nationalist movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.³⁷ Still one of the most powerful ideological movements in history,³⁸ pent up ethnic tensions, especially when combined with the highly efficient killing instruments of modern war, constitute a considerable threat to stability in Europe.³⁹

PROXIMATE CAUSES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

While policymakers cannot affect the past, they can influence the immediate causes contributing to ethnic frictions and extinguish sparks before they set off an explosion of violence. Few ethnic conflicts will emerge from a single issue. Understanding how the interplay of the specific proximate causes of an ethnic conflict (e.g, political discord, territorial demands, economic distress, and societal cleavages) lead to friction between ethnic groups offers policymakers insights into ways to ease tensions, reconcile the underlying causes of

ethnic animosity, deter violence, or resolve an ongoing conflict. Policymakers and military participants must quickly identify these critical issues and focus their efforts on resolving the more important ones. At the same time, they cannot ignore lesser issues. For without recognizing the totality of the problem, policymakers will not be able to meld the appropriate elements of national power into a holistic solution.

These points are especially salient for the American military—particularly the U.S. Army—which may be the leading edge of policy execution.⁴⁰ Without a detailed understanding, military analysts and planners may find it difficult to devise appropriate strategies and operational plans that provide the conditions for a successful resolution of the crisis or conflict.

Political Issues.

Political issues lie at the heart of ethnic conflict in Europe. Indeed, one might conclude that ethnic conflict results when existing political arrangements that had previously checked conflict break down.⁴¹ As Stavenhagen observes, these political failures manifest themselves in a variety of ways.

Ethnic conflicts generally involve a clash of interests or a struggle over rights: rights to land, education, the use of language, political representation, freedom of religion, the preservation of ethnic identity, autonomy, or self-determination, etc.⁴²

Political conditions also drive ethnic competition. Lack of political representation, under-representation, outright discrimination, or perceived inequalities motivate ethnic groups to challenge the existing political system. This usually means confronting the ethnic majority or another ethnic group for control of, or access into, internal political systems. As Ted R. Gurr and others observe, potential points of contention include: entree to positions of power—at national, regional, or local levels; access to civil service posts; membership in police and military organizations; the right to organized political activity; voting rights; or equal legal protection.⁴³

These issues frequently lead to the development of political parties along ethnic lines, which, in turn, tend to politicize and

institutionalize ethnic divisions.⁴⁴ Because of the nature of political campaigns, emotions run high and oratory sometimes outraces rationality, creating an increasing spiral of rhetoric, emotions, and fear. Finally, where parties clearly divide along ethnic lines, the majority ethnic group tends to dominate the political process.⁴⁵ Under the best of circumstances, such an outcome can create apprehension among ethnic minorities. At the worst, it can lead to one party rule and ethnic oppression.

Economic Motivations.

Economic motivations often go hand in hand with political issues. These tensions generally can be grouped in categories: disparate income; inequitable land and property distribution; uneven distribution of economic resources and capital; access to higher education; or participation in commercial activities and professions.⁴⁶ These circumstances can also lead to economic competition, business rivalries, unequal division of labor, and class competition—particularly for low-end jobs—that break down along ethnic lines and contribute to ethnic tensions.⁴⁷

Societal Cleavages.

Societal cleavages that result from political and economic issues also frequently compound ethnic tensions. For example, one ethnic group might participate in commercial activities, while another pursues industrialization, while a third remains tied to agriculture.⁴⁸ Such developments set the stage for what Horowitz calls the "backward versus advanced" phenomenon, where groups compare themselves in invidious manners that contribute to conflict.⁴⁹ Moreover, despite the persistent belief that education, industrialization, urbanization, and exposure to a multicultural environment would reduce the incidence of ethnic animosities, this has not been the case. These trends frequently resulted in ethnic stratification that led to economic rivalry and increased ethnic tensions.⁵⁰ Indeed, the coincidence of modernizing societies, privatization and liberalization of economies, and differing rates of social development have stressed some societies to the point where

a relatively minor issue may become the "straw that breaks the camel's back."⁵¹

Self-determination.

The international community's continued incantation of the shibboleth of "the self-determination of peoples" is a significant proximate cause of ethnic conflict in the post-cold war world.⁵² Since Woodrow Wilson announced his "Fourteen Points" peace proposal to end World War I, the phrase "the self-determination of peoples" has assumed almost mythical status for groups who use "sound bites" to justify their quest for an ethnically-based nation-state.⁵³ But, how far should self-determination be carried out? Logically, it could be extended to include tribes, clans, or even individual family members. Even when not carried to absurd levels, self-determination can splinter a state or society. Such fracturing is particularly likely after a long period of authoritarian rule, or imperial collapse, such as the end of the cold war and the collapse of authoritarian states within Europe.⁵⁴ U.S. policy-makers must, therefore, reexamine whether unconstrained support of this principle remains in U.S. national interests.

Ironically, those advocating self-determination could use supra-European integration to support their cause. Ethnic groups might argue that the traditional functions of the state: monetary policy, security and defense matters, foreign policy, welfare institutions, etc., would be subsumed under the European Union, thereby eliminating the need for an existing nation-state. Under these conditions, they could claim greater autonomy within the context of a "United Europe," and states would wither away. This outcome is not far-fetched, as numerous groups throughout Western Europe could foreseeably opt for autonomy within a European super-state: Belgium (Flemings, Walloons), Spain (Catalans, Galicians, Basques), France (Corsicans), or Italy (Northern Italian "Lega,"⁵⁵ Sardinians, or Sicilians).

Such phenomenon present a three-fold problem. First, Europeans (West, Central, or East) intent on pursuing increased integration may not realize the unintended

consequence of statal disintegration. Second, such statal disintegration in Central or Eastern Europe—where ethnic issues have not been resolved to the degree that they have in Western Europe—would undoubtedly occur along ethnic lines, potentially heightening ethnic tensions throughout the region. Third, because ". . . many ethnic communities feel a strong association with particular, so-called 'national' territory, and use historical, pseudo-historical, or even mythical arguments to press their claim . . . ,"⁵⁶ such disintegration would undoubtedly increase competition for control of territory, as co-ethnics attempt to bring all members of the group within contiguous boundaries.⁵⁷

To avoid statal disintegration via supra-national integration, the United States should support the "German model" of "widening" EU membership. This approach is opposed by the "French model" that has emphasized a "deepening" of the EU (i.e., a closer integration of existing members, concomitant with increased centralization in Brussels, that would lead not only to increased economic ties, but also common political, diplomatic, and security policies) before rapidly expanding its membership.⁵⁸ Obviously, such a tack runs the risk of complicating Franco-U.S. bilateral relations, as well as those within NATO.

THE SPECTRUM OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN EUROPE

Once ethnic conflict erupts, the accompanying violence can take many forms, ranging from nonviolent protests within existing legal systems to open warfare between various ethnic groups. (See Figure 2.)⁵⁹ Levels of violence within the spectrum may also vary considerably: from riots to terrorism to insurgency to mid-intensity combat between regular forces armed with modern, sophisticated weapons. Understanding the form that conflict may take, the interactions between the various elements along the spectrum of ethnic conflict, and the potential consequences will help policymakers assess appropriate policy responses. Currently, the full range of ethnic conflict is evident in Europe. Nonviolent protests and demonstrations have taken place in Germany, for example, in support of the large Turkish population which has been

Spectrum of Ethnic Conflict




Figure 2.

assaulted by right-wing German youth.⁶⁰ Long-standing debates between Flemings and Walloons in Belgium for greater home rule represent more peaceful means available to ameliorate ethnic animosities. On the other hand, the long terror campaign of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Party (ETA) or the continuing bombing campaign of Corsican "nationalists" offers samples of separatist or secessionist violence present in the "ethnically quiescent" western portion of Europe.⁶¹

Repression of minorities is most obvious, perhaps, in the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, where Serbs keep ethnic Albanians in Kosovo under iron rule.⁶² Finally, examples of irredentism are rife: most notably Serb and Croat seizure of large portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, and civil war between Georgians and Ossetians over control of South

Ossetia, or between Georgians and Abkhazi over southern Abkhazia.

PATTERNS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT⁶³

Within the spectrum of ethnic conflict, certain patterns may be discerned. Understanding these patterns and the circumstances under which they occur may improve policymakers' comprehension of a particular conflict. Analysts can then use this understanding to develop potential solutions. While ethnic conflict can assume a number of patterns, to include nonviolent means, the discussion that follows focuses on the violent end of the conflict spectrum.

Nonviolent means of ethnic conflict may be appropriate if the extant political process supports such an option.⁶⁴ Should peaceful efforts fall short of expectations, however, or if there is no viable political process which disaffected ethnic groups can pursue, then demands for civil rights or greater autonomy can be manifested in more violent means. These may take the form of violent protests, riots, or the destruction of property.⁶⁵ The potential exists for increasing forms of violence, such as terrorism or open civil conflict. What policymakers and military practitioners must understand is that apparently benign conditions (e.g., supervising the conduct of elections) can quickly sour and military forces must be prepared to engage rapidly in combat operations.⁶⁶ U.S. forces present in such situations, therefore, must safeguard themselves at all times, and must be ready to conduct combat operations when directed by competent authorities.

Repression of ethnic enclaves has long been a prevalent means of holding ethnic groups in check. The level of violence spans from random individual acts of terrorism to organized governmental violence intended to cow an entire ethnic minority. Current examples (i.e., Albanians in Kosovo, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, and, to a lesser extent, Hungarians in Vojvodina) indicate that such practices will continue for the foreseeable future. Additionally, traditional groups that have suffered the diaspora of their people (i.e., Jews and Gypsies) have been joined by ethnic Russians in the

now-independent states of the former Soviet Union.⁶⁷ Whether these new Russian minorities will suffer discrimination within their ethnically different states is an open-ended question. Militant Russian reactions to any real or perceived discrimination, however, would undoubtedly have tremendous repercussions throughout Europe.

Separatist or secessionist movements tend to follow two divergent paths. On the one hand, ethnic *cum* national groups may search for a legal, peaceful separation of ethnic groups into independent states. The peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic and the breakup of the Soviet Union (save the Transcaucasus and Tajikistan) are recent examples of peaceful separation.⁶⁸ More frequently, separatist movements resort to violence to achieve their ends. The mode of violence varies according to the circumstances, but terrorism has long been a weapon of choice of separatists—although it has not yielded significant success.

Irredentism, or "one state's attempt to claim or reincorporate contiguous territory occupied by ethnic kinsmen,"⁶⁹ represents another pattern of ethnic conflict. This condition usually results from boundaries drawn without full regard for the ethnic composition of a region, or from changes in ethnic composition after boundaries were drawn.⁷⁰ With the end of the territorial "stability" provided by the bipolar world, irredenta could once again surface in Central and South-eastern Europe and threaten stability in those regions.⁷¹ This may be especially true of the breakup of the Soviet empire which has left 25 million ethnic Russians outside Russia's borders. Moreover, economic uncertainty in many of the newly independent nations,⁷² historical rivalries (e.g., between the states of the Transcaucasus), and traditional territorial disputes (e.g., Crimea, Nagorno-Karabakh) compound ethnic issues.

Irredentism in Europe may be somewhat constrained, however. As the definition implies, irredentist movements require the active participation of an existing state. Because of the international ramifications of such active participation in a conflict, few states in contemporary Europe have been willing to underwrite an irredentist agenda.⁷³ Moreover, as Donald

Horowitz points out, other pitfalls face an irredentist power: few states in Europe are ethnically homogeneous and support of irredentism may generate irredentism directed against the originating state; for a variety of political or economic reasons, not all elements of the existing state may want to include "outsiders"; and the group across the border may not want to be retrieved.⁷⁴

Europe has long suffered from *terrorism* that often had an ethnic or political basis.⁷⁵ As a result, most countries within the region are used to dealing with terrorism at the national and international level. The United States, at least within its own borders, lacks this level of experience and should be prepared for an upsurge in ethnically-based terrorism.⁷⁶ The United States may need to take additional steps to improve international counterterrorist cooperation. The U.S. military can provide capabilities to support such efforts, or cooperate in such ventures.

Insurgency techniques offer another violent alternative, but have rarely been seen in Europe and may not be appropriate in the future. That said, it is possible that groups unable to attain their goals through peaceful means or through terrorism could graduate to the use of insurgency. Handling insurgencies will present significant challenges to European democracies, particularly since the United States and those European nations experienced with insurgencies have a poor record.⁷⁷

Communal violence is essentially conflict between competing ethnic groups living in close proximity to each other.⁷⁸ Potential degrees of violence run from individual attacks upon members of a dissimilar ethnic group to large scale combat between forces drawn from the various ethnic communities. Communal violence may be the most difficult pattern of ethnic conflict to overcome. The intermingling of populations and the ethnic animosities that have developed over time frequently erupt in the most brutal forms of atrocities that can result in an increasing spiral of violence. Such intermingling also complicates the ability to separate belligerents or to intervene between the various parties. Current conflicts in Moldova ("Moldovans," ethnic Romanians, Russians, Ukrainians), the Transcaucasus (Georgians,

Abkhazis, and Ossetians), but particularly Bosnia-Herzegovina (Croats vs. Serbs, Serbs vs. Muslims, Muslims vs. Croats, and Muslims vs. Muslims), offer ample evidence of the degree of communal violence in Europe.

SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

In addition to the patterns of violence, certain distinctive characteristics help shape each ethnic conflict. That said, it may not be possible to identify all potential characteristics that could be applied. Nor will every conflict display all or perhaps even a majority of the general characteristics. Within a specific conflict, however, the type of characteristics displayed, how they combine, how they blend with the patterns of conflict, and where they fall along the spectrum of violence will establish the unique nature of the conflict. If analysts are to craft solutions to ethnic conflict, they must understand the more important characteristics and their relationships.

Civil War.

Historically, ethnic conflicts sometimes take on the characteristics of civil war. This trend continues, as conflicts in Moldova, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the former Yugoslavia graphically illustrate. Civil wars represent considerable challenges to outsiders seeking ways to terminate the violence. On the one hand are the difficulties inherent in intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.⁷⁹ On the other hand, the state may have collapsed and policymakers may not be able to determine who—if anyone—represents legitimate authority. Moreover, different ethnic groups may enjoy long-term relationships with outside powers that complicate the ability to arrive at a regional or international consensus on how to adjudicate the crisis.⁸⁰ Finally, civil wars usually are not ended by negotiation. Total capitulation, expulsion, or outright extermination tend to dominate resolution trends.⁸¹

Multiple Actors.

Second, the numbers and diverse types of actors involved in ethnic conflict tend to complicate the efforts to resolve ethnic

tensions. As Brian Nichiporuk has concluded, at least eight potential actors or groups of actors could be involved in an ethnic conflict:

- Established nation-states (e.g., Russia, Spain)
- National ethnic insurgency movements (e.g., Bosnian Serbs)
- Subnational ethnic separatist movements (e.g., Abkhazis in Georgia, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh)
- Autonomous regions (e.g., Chechnya, Tatarstan in Russia)
- Subnational ethnic militia (e.g., Kurdish Workers' Party [PKK] in Turkey)
- Transnational ethnic fronts (e.g., Kurdish special interest groups)
- Subnational terrorist movements (e.g., the Basque ETA)
- Transnational ethnic terrorist movements (e.g., Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia)⁸²

A high probability exists that more than one actor will be present in any given ethnic conflict. The number of participants exponentially increases the difficulties inherent in developing policies for resolving the conflict. Nonstate actors, who may play significant roles, frequently do not recognize established international norms of behavior; that is, they are intent on overturning, not maintaining, the status quo. Thus, they oftentimes are uninterested in negotiations. Even when these groups participate, they are usually less amenable to compromise, or the traditional western calculus of costs, risks, and benefits.⁸³

Americans who have been schooled in the application of these principles may have a difficult time adjusting to the unfamiliar political mores of many participants. The typical response is to consider these uncooperative sorts irrational.⁸⁴ But policymakers and military leaders must understand that their interlocutors may be highly logical; they simply follow a

different logic or use different assumptions. Policymakers must recognize these differences in perspective, understand their interlocutors' logic (this does not infer that they must agree with that logic—only that they understand it), and use this understanding to develop viable short- and long-term solutions to the problems at hand.

Commitment.

A third characteristic concerns the high degree of commitment and motivation that ethnic conflict generates. As Clausewitz noted nearly two centuries ago, "Even the most civilized of peoples, in short, can be fired with passionate hatred for each other."⁸⁵ And, ethnic violence tends to heighten emotions further. This oftentimes leads to a broad and highly committed base of support, which provides ample numbers of highly motivated fighters. Because of their commitment to their cause, typically they are neither easily deterred nor defeated by limited means. And, because intense emotions are the norm, a high probability of violence fuels their commitment. Finally, increased emotions tend to constrain the already limited negotiating room of political and military leaders. Locked in an attitude that views compromise as weakness, few leaders or followers may be amenable to a negotiated solution.⁸⁶

Warrior Societies.

Fourth, ethnic conflict tends to mobilize all members of an ethnic group, regardless of age or sex. And, because participants tend to see the conflict as a "zero-sum game," where defeat means at least oppression and probably death, these groups may use personnel (i.e., women and children) and tactics (e.g., using noncombatants as shields) that fall well outside accepted western rules of war. This may blur the traditional distinctions between combatants and noncombatants that normally guide U.S. military forces and many U.S. European allies, and may place U.S. personnel at a decided tactical disadvantage. Military leaders must prepare their soldiers for such situations, and political leaders must understand that such tactics may lead to casualties among

groups that Americans normally do not perceive as combatants.⁸⁷

Duration.

Fifth, ethnic conflicts tend to last a long time, on average six times longer than the typical conventional conflict.⁸⁸ The reasons for this are severalfold. The tactics of at least one side usually depend on terrorism or insurgency to undermine the structure of the status quo, and neither side has sufficient military power to achieve decisive victory. This condition frequently leads to increasing levels of violence which, in turn, heighten emotions and motivate parties to continue fighting to "settle scores."⁸⁹ Prolonged fighting can lead to "peacekeeper fatigue," the eventual withdrawal of peacekeeping forces, and wider fighting.⁹⁰ Finally, the longer a conflict lasts, the greater chance an outside group will intervene to support its ethnic kin, or the conflict will expand beyond its original borders.

Volatility.

Sixth, the emotions and circumstances surrounding ethnic conflicts tend to blur distinctions among peace, crisis, conflict, and war. Nonstate actors, spontaneous violence, frequently uncontrolled subordinate elements of ethnic adversaries, and heightened animosities create a highly volatile atmosphere where violent eruptions can take place with little or no warning.⁹¹ This is a highly relevant characteristic for military leaders, who must plan and provide for the military capabilities necessary to protect their forces across the spectrum of ethnic conflict, as well as the broad range of military operations that may be required to respond to a rapidly changing strategic and operational environment.

Borders and Demography.

A seventh characteristic is that European state borders seldom coincide with ethnic boundaries and many groups may receive outside support.⁹² Policymakers and military planners must take these conditions into account. The most likely possibility is irredentism and secession which would result in

outside intervention and expand a local conflict into an interstate dispute.⁹³ Thus, nations involved in resolving ethnic conflicts may have to develop dual strategies: an internal strategy to cope with the conflict within state borders and an external strategy to deny outside support to combatants.

While the preceding discussion is not exhaustive, it does elaborate the more important characteristics of ethnic conflict in Europe. While these traits are individually important, the more critical issue for analysts is to understand how these characteristics combine to form the unique nature of a specific ethnic conflict. Each will have a different point of origin and evolution; therefore, each will present unique strategic risks, will require a different intervention strategy, and will have distinct potentials for success. The reasons behind the conflict, the type, pattern, and levels of violence will require an equally unique solution that reflects its specific context. Finally, it bears repeating that the depth of emotion, the passions invoked, and, frequently, the tendency toward civil war make compromise difficult. To the development of such solutions the discussion next turns.

CRAFTING POLICY: EASIER SAID THAN DONE

In an ideal world, policymakers follow a rigorous logic when crafting policy options to resolve ethnic conflict. Before involving the United States in a particular ethnic conflict, policymakers would first identify U.S. national interests and assess whether a particular ethnic conflict justified U.S. intervention. Analysts then would devise a series of strategic alternatives to safeguard U.S. interests.⁹⁴ Next, they would assess which option or combination of options would best achieve national political objectives while satisfying the constraints imposed by political and military concepts and resources. Finally, policymakers would implement the options.

A good model to use in developing policy alternatives focuses on identifying and balancing objectives (ends), concepts (ways), and resources (means).⁹⁵ Such a process serves a number of purposes. First, it provides a logical analytical structure for the development of strategic options.

Second, this model links ends, ways, and means and national interests. Third, the process can be used iteratively throughout a U.S. engagement to ensure that objectives, concepts, and resources remain synchronized, thereby precluding cleavage among ends, ways, and means and national interests. Fourth, the model can be used to conduct risk assessments that identify discontinuities that could adversely affect policy.

Unfortunately, reality rarely conforms to such an ideal process. That said, policymakers should hew as close as possible to such a methodology when crafting strategic alternatives for ethnic conflict in Europe. The process should still commence with the identification of U.S. interests in Europe. Fortunately for analysts, many of these interests are identified in or may be derived from a variety of official documents, unofficial sources, and independent analysis. For example, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* clearly articulates U.S. national interests as:

- A secure and stable Europe;
- Enlargement of democracy and free markets in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly Russia;
- U.S. access to a vibrant European economy;
- Continued maintenance of a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization.⁹⁶

Not included in this document, but clearly identified as U.S. interests are continued U.S. leadership and prestige in the region.⁹⁷ An unstated interest (because it would be impolitic to say officially) is that the United States should not allow Russia to use ethnic conflict as an excuse to establish a sphere of influence in the "near abroad" of Central and Eastern Europe.

But an assessment of U.S. interests may not be as simple as it first appears. For example, if viewed in isolation, a conflict may not appear to directly affect the interests outlined above. Analysts and decisionmakers must look beyond the surface issues, however, and assess second and third order consequences of the conflict. They must identify and evaluate potential branches or paths that a particular crisis might follow

and assess whether these less obvious, but perhaps significant, consequences might affect the United States. Second, a cold, rational approach may not take into account subjective issues, such as humanitarian interests or moral questions that exert considerable influence on the analytical process and which can cloud decisionmaking waters. Third, policymakers must evaluate not only the risks inherent in U.S. intervention, but also the potential hazards if the United States chooses not to become involved in conflict resolution efforts.

To Intervene?

In assessing the risks inherent in intervention, decisionmakers first must recognize that regardless of their initial intent a significant potential exists for the United States to be drawn more deeply into a conflict than may be merited by threats to U.S. interests.⁹⁸ Should this occur, the consequences can be considerable. Resources, international prestige, national energies, and lives could be expended far out of proportion to the original risks to U.S. interests.

Active U.S. intervention, particularly with ground forces, also runs the risk of making the United States a target of all sides. At the very least, the side enjoying the advantage prior to the intervention will resent the U.S. presence. If peacekeepers or peace-enforcers truly operate on a neutral basis, then the weaker side may become disenchanted and also target U.S. forces.⁹⁹ Nor are potential dangers limited to deployed forces. Disaffected groups or individuals could conduct terrorist actions in the United States. Such activities could also cause political difficulties within the United States.

American participation also raises the possibility of a long-term U.S. commitment. If the United States is to contribute effectively, American leaders must be prepared for long-term obligations, perhaps in terms of decades or generations. Simply put, as a number of examples illustrate (e.g., Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Yugoslavia), there are few short-term solutions to problems that have festered for decades. Historically, however, the American public has been unwilling to sustain a prolonged commitment of American forces in

harm's way without a clear likelihood of success.¹⁰⁰ Policymakers, therefore, must carefully balance risks to U.S. interests, potential time required, and endurance of the American public *before* deciding to intervene.

Decisionmakers must also consider the difficulties inherent in trying to disengage. On the one hand, policymakers must plan for successful disengagement. This requires a clear understanding of the desired political and military end states. Equally important, analysts must identify political, military, or economic measures of effectiveness that they can use to assess progress toward those goals. If these key points are not established prior to U.S. entry into the conflict, then U.S. actions may stray from intended strategic objectives. Or, U.S. involvement may wander aimlessly, perhaps at great costs in national energies, resources, and, more importantly, lives.

More problematic is determining how the United States can disengage when measures of effectiveness indicate that successful resolution may not be possible, or at least at acceptable costs. For instance, U.S. interests might be better served by U.S. withdrawal, but the imminent resumption of hostilities, or the high potential that the withdrawal of U.S. forces would result in the return of the conditions that prompted intervention in the first place, may hinder the U.S. ability to disengage.¹⁰¹ Further, once committed, U.S. prestige is at stake, and the direct or indirect international repercussions of a departure may severely circumscribe U.S. disengagement options. Given the potential consequences, policymakers must assess these constraints *before* deciding to intervene in an ethnic conflict.

Or Not to Intervene?

While the consequences of intervening in ethnic conflict may be considerable, abstaining from intervention is not risk free. Ethnic conflicts also have considerable potential to destabilize emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. Nowhere is this more important than in the former Soviet Union where ethnic animosities have reemerged with a vengeance in Moldova and Transcaucasia. Moreover, past

Soviet nationalism and ethnic policies have resulted in considerable Russian minorities in areas no longer governed from Moscow. U.S. failure to engage in the resolution of these conflicts at an early stage could lead to violence that derails democratic growth in the region. In a worst case scenario, an outbreak of ethnic violence would precipitate a Russian reaction that would destabilize much of Eastern Europe.¹⁰²

Instability could also seriously disrupt markets in several areas of Europe. Even if major markets are not affected, new markets emerging from the end of the cold war, which hold significant potential for U.S. trade, could be denied to U.S. commercial interests.

Should the United States initially remain aloof from an ethnic conflict, allies and friends could draw in the United States. If the United States is to be involved eventually, U.S. interests might be better served through early intervention, when a crisis could be resolved short of conflict or before conflict escalated to a point that threatened U.S. interests. Worse, U.S. inaction could lead to allies being drawn into opposing sides of a conflict (e.g., Greece and Turkey in the Balkans). Such an occurrence might not only have adverse effects on bilateral relations between the United States and its allies, but also could unravel NATO.

American inactivity, even in a relatively low-level crisis, could have considerable consequences. Much of Western Europe is attempting to cope with immigration that would only be exacerbated by an influx of refugees.¹⁰³ Or, large scale violence, significant casualties, or widespread violations of human rights would set back U.S. efforts to enlarge democracy in Europe. More importantly, a European inability to cope with ethnic violence calls into question the efficacy of European security institutions and architecture (i.e., the EU, WEU, and CSCE in the current crisis in the former Yugoslavia), and could lead to a breakup of the alliance system (e.g., NATO, WEU). This might also contribute to the renationalization of European security agendas.

Finally, should America stand aside from an ethnic conflict, Europeans may perceive that the United States is abrogating

its global leadership responsibilities. At the very least, when coupled with recent U.S. neo-isolationist sentiment and a reduced U.S. presence in Europe, they might seriously question the level of U.S. commitment to Europe, possibly eroding U.S. influence in this major region of the world.¹⁰⁴ Thus, while U.S. interests could be placed at considerable risk if the United States becomes involved in European ethnic conflict, U.S. nonparticipation is not risk free. Policymakers must, therefore, carefully weigh their options, and assess the long-term consequences of U.S. participation or abstention from ethnic conflict in Europe.

Strategic Alternatives: Ends.

Should the U.S. Government determine that national interests are sufficiently at risk to justify American involvement in an ethnic conflict (whether nascent, ongoing, or post-hostilities), the policy development process would shift to formulating and assessing strategic alternatives. Developing such alternatives begins with the identifying strategic objectives or ends. For, paraphrasing Clausewitz, "No one [enters an ethnic conflict]—or rather no one in his senses ought to—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that [intervention] and how he intends to conduct it."¹⁰⁵ Without clear strategic objectives, policymakers will face considerable difficulties in correlating objectives, concepts, and resources. This can lead decisionmakers to develop strategic ends that hinder or preclude the formulation of clear-cut military objectives and missions to achieve the political objectives. Or, confusion may result that leads to cleavage between national and military policies that contributes to policy failure.¹⁰⁶

In the case of ethnically-based violence, identifying strategic ends would seem to be relatively straightforward: the long-term resolution—preferably peacefully—of the conflict. But, as Clausewitz reminded us nearly two centuries ago, "everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean everything is very easy."¹⁰⁷ For example, "stop the killing" is a simple goal, but it is not easily attained. Policymakers will need to focus on specific, concrete objectives that can be achieved:

e.g., physically contain the conflict within existing borders, interpose forces between belligerents, undertake peace-enforcement operations to establish stability or protect the distribution of humanitarian assistance. Indeed, strategic ends may have to be divided into phases: short-, medium-, and long-term, and synchronized to ensure that short-term efforts support, rather than derail, long-term objectives.

Strategic Alternatives: Ways.

Once policymakers have identified appropriate strategic objectives, they must then develop concepts that will guide U.S. participation and contribute to achieving strategic ends. Based on an assessment of the U.S. interests involved, the unique characteristics of the conflict, and the level of violence (ongoing or potential), decisionmakers must calculate the appropriate mix of the elements of national power (political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, or military).¹⁰⁸ For example, in a pre-conflict scenario, the United States might predominantly rely on diplomatic or economic initiatives to resolve ethnic tensions or deter violence. On the other hand, decisionmakers might opt to include military support to diplomacy that could include a show of force to deter conflict by one party, or the preventive deployment of an interpositional force to separate potential belligerents. (See Figure 3.)

Should tensions escalate into violence, or if the United States decided to intervene in an ongoing conflict, a number of options would be available.¹⁰⁹ If policymakers assess, for example, that little potential exists for significant escalation of violence within a state, or that there are few indications that the conflict could spill across international borders, the United States could focus on political, diplomatic, or economic efforts to resolve a crisis. If a high potential for intrastate or interstate escalation exists, then the United States might take political, diplomatic, and, especially, military steps to contain the conflict geographically. The difficulty for the policymaker is in identifying and assessing the specific option or set of options that will best meet the unique demands of the specific ethnic conflict. Moreover, analysts and policymakers must blend these alternatives to craft a coherent policy that meets political

Policy Options

To dampen ethnic tensions before they erupt in violence or preclude escalation of an ongoing conflict will require U.S. policymakers and their military advisors to undertake proactive policy initiatives; e.g.:

- Diplomatic: Diplomatic recognition
Break or lessen diplomatic relations
Active mediation between parties
Entry into regional economic or security organizations
Building coalitions of those willing to cooperate in preventive or deterrent efforts
- Economic: Nation assistance
Special trading rights
Greater access to U.S. or EU markets
Grants of foreign aid
Withdrawal of trading rights or foreign aid
Sanctions or embargoes
- Military: Show of force
Preventive deployments
Enforcement of UN, CSCE, or NATO sanctions
Security assistance
Peace support or peacekeeping operations

Figure 3.

and military constraints while achieving national objectives. The discussion that follows highlights these issues.

Political Options.

Once the costs of participation have been weighed against U.S. interests, policymakers must establish the limits of what the United States is *willing* to do to resolve a particular situation. Theoretically, at least, a multitude of ways, many of them peaceful, have been suggested to resolve ethnic conflict. (See Figure 4.)¹¹⁰ A conflict aversion model (Figure 5) could be applied to prevent the outbreak of violence. Or, policymakers could pursue options intended to influence behaviors that would either deter conflict or discourage escalation of ethnically-motivated violence. (Figure 6)

Strategic Options for Controlling Ethnic Conflict




Figure 4.

In examining potential policy options, the primary focus should be on political solutions. A number of political options are available, but the likelihood of long-term success is problematic. Territorial redistribution among ethnic groups, for example, sounds superficially appealing, but is fraught with difficulty. Given the interspersed ethnic populations in Europe, it would be impossible to redraw borders that satisfy all parties in a conflict.¹¹¹ If boundary lines cannot be redrawn to accommodate ethnic groups, then an alternative—albeit undesirable—is to displace populations to conform to the borders. First, individuals may be unwilling to leave long-held ethnic areas or traditional lands and force may have to be used. Second, population redistribution smacks of "ethnic cleansing." Third, large scale population transfers historically have resulted in considerable privation, misery, and death.¹¹²

Reforming the internal distribution of political power within a state to satisfy ethnic demands is another option. As John Coakley points out, peaceful demands for equality of citizenship, cultural rights, equitable distribution of resources, and institutional political recognition can be achieved.

Conflict Aversion Model



Figure 5.

Centralized state political power, but decentralized resource sharing, cultural autonomy, or separate language (e.g., Belgium, France, Italy, Spain or the United Kingdom); regionalism or regional autonomy (e.g., Italy and Spain); federalism (Belgium), or confederalism (e.g., Switzerland) are all ways to arrive at a common end.¹¹³ Most dramatically, a nation-state could permit the secession of an ethnic group, such as Sweden's acquiescence to Norwegian independence in 1905.

Ted R. Gurr offers further possibilities. Majorities can recognize the rights of minorities and grant access to a pluralistic society. Assimilation with the majority is another




Figure 6.

option, though obviously this may be problematic. A separate but equal status holds some promise, but could require such extreme measures as population exchange, segregation, and the containment of one segment of society; thus, calling into question how long such a regime could remain peaceful.¹¹⁴

Establishing or increasing reliance on ethnic parties, in conjunction with some form of guaranteed power-sharing arrangement, is another potential solution. This option runs the risk, however, of reinforcing societal cleavages unless a relative balance of populations and power exists between ethnic groups. And, because guaranteed power-sharing arrangements may dampen motivation to resolve political

differences, such schemes frequently are disincentives to removing the underlying political causes of the violence, and may actually defer conflict resolution.¹¹⁵ Conversely, such power-sharing arrangements may grant a "cooling-off" period that allows participants to regain control of the situation, establish a dialogue, and pave the way for ultimate resolution of the underlying causes of the conflict.

The best long-term solution to ethnic tensions or conflict is broad-based, pluralistic government. This is easier said than done, because, *for such political solutions to work, all parties involved in ethnic disputes must be amenable to compromise.* In ethnic conflict, where participants tend to view events in zero sum game terms, such compromise may require considerable time and may occur only after widespread violence. And, as Benjamin Schwarz cogently points out, rarely have these conditions been the historical case.¹¹⁶ Nor, given the current circumstances in Central, Southeastern, and Eastern Europe, are they likely to hold in the near future.

A lasting political solution may also require a considerable, long-term, cooperative, and coordinated commitment on the part of the United States and its European allies. For example, the United States and its partners could tie future political, economic, and military assistance to a recipient's commitment to broad representational government. They could also provide incentives that promote pluralistic government (e.g., membership in the Council of Europe, European Free Trade Association, European Union, NATO, CSCE bodies). Conversely, they could make plain the disincentives (e.g., denial of aid and assistance, withdrawal of trading privileges, sanctions, boycotts) that could be applied to deter should a country pursue internal policies that might lead to ethnic violence.

Under even the most favorable circumstances, U.S. policymakers must realize that the United States will have to display considerable patience and perseverance, and understand that setbacks will occur along the way. They must also recognize that while political options are preferred, frequently they possess limited utility. And, while this circumstance is regrettable, it reflects the reality of ethnic

politics and conflict. Policymakers should be prepared, therefore, to implement military options that bolster political alternatives.

Military Ways.

Because political solutions require substantial time and policymakers may be under pressure "to do something," tremendous pressure can build to commit military forces as a means of halting ethnic conflict. Or, if political options have failed, political leaders may feel compelled to turn to largely military solutions. In either case, should the United States opt to use military force to assist in resolving ethnic violence, a number of options are available to policymakers. (See Figures 5, 6, and 7.)

Policymakers only delude themselves, however, if they rely predominantly on military force to resolve ethnic conflicts. They must accept the fact that, at heart, ethnic conflicts stem from political, economic, and societal bases,¹¹⁷ and understand the implications: *the use of military force alone will not resolve the underlying roots of ethnic conflict*. That said, policymakers and military authorities must understand that it may be necessary to introduce military force into the equation. Military power must be integrated with the other elements of national power in a coherent manner that supports U.S. national interests.

Military efforts to resolve ethnic conflict fall under the general rubric of peace operations. Depending upon the context of the ethnic conflict, the actual or anticipated level of violence, and the policy option chosen, a broad range of military operations could be required. As currently envisaged in the latest version of Field Manual (FM) 100-23, *Peace Operations* (draft), Army forces can expect to provide support to diplomacy (to include peacemaking, preventative diplomacy, and peace-building), conduct peacekeeping missions, and perform peace enforcement operations.¹¹⁸ (See Figure 8.) Because of the importance of these missions and the fact that large segments of the military or civilian policymaking audience may be unfamiliar with the terms, each will be briefly elaborated below.

Conflict Resolution Options




Figure 7.

Policy Options and Potential Military Missions




Figure 8.

"*Peacemaking* is a process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that ends disputes and resolves issues that led to conflict."¹¹⁹ While a military role might seem minimal, military forces can contribute substantially to peacemaking efforts. For example, individuals and units could take part in military-to-military relations (such as the U.S. European Command's current bilateral military-to-military contacts program or through multilateral efforts such as NATO's Partnership for Peace program) which can contribute to improved civil-military relations and serve as a brake on ethnonationalist tendencies. Similar results could be derived from security assistance operations. Shows of force or the employment of military forces to support the enforcement of UN resolutions (for example, Operation SHARP GUARD, the maritime enforcement of the embargo of Yugoslavia; and Operation DENY FLIGHT, enforcement of the "no-fly zone" over Bosnia-Herzegovina) could be used to reinforce diplomatic efforts.

"*Preventive diplomacy* involves diplomatic actions taken in advance of a crisis to prevent or limit violence."¹²⁰ While preventative diplomacy relies predominantly on diplomatic efforts, military forces and particularly U.S. Army forces can provide vital support to diplomatic efforts. For example, individuals or units can conduct fact-finding missions, participate in arbitration, or mediate potential conflicts. Employment of military elements may also reassure negotiating parties, as well as send a subtle message that U.S. military power may be an element to be reckoned with (e.g., the deployment of U.S. ground forces to Macedonia).

Military participation in preventative diplomacy also holds potential pitfalls. Officials must guard against raising false expectations of participants who might use U.S. military involvement to justify prolonging or aborting negotiations.¹²¹ Second, U.S. officials must acknowledge the possibility that American forces might become involved in the conflict through a conventional attack or terrorist activities by one side or another.¹²² Finally, because participants in an ethnic conflict are likely to test U.S. resolve, policymakers must ensure they possess the political will to carry out the coercive use of military

force. If the United States is unwilling to follow up its rhetoric with action, then empty threats will only encourage recalcitrant behavior or reinforce the perception that belligerents can simply outwait the United States.¹²³ Moreover, these repercussions could carry over beyond the current conflict to other ethnic violence, or even to aggressive behavior by potential opponents throughout the world.

"*Peace-building* consists of *postconflict* actions, primarily diplomatic, that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. It also includes mechanisms to advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction."¹²⁴ While largely the responsibility of civil organizations, military forces can play a role. For example, U.S. Army civil affairs units could assist in the rebuilding of governmental infrastructure, or help develop new, more democratic forms of government. Combat support and combat service support units could assist in the reestablishment of basic life support and human services, eventually to be handed over to civil control.

"*Peacekeeping* involves neutral military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the *consent of all major belligerents*. These operations are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement."¹²⁵ Peacekeeping operations vary from individual soldiers acting as observers or monitors (e.g., such as on the Golan Heights or in Lebanon) to the deployment of large units to oversee a ceasefire or negotiated settlement.¹²⁶

"*Peace enforcement* is the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions."¹²⁷ The purpose of such operations ". . . is to maintain or restore peace and *support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement*."¹²⁸ Peace enforcement operations cover a broad spectrum, but, most importantly, they include combat operations. Illustrative examples of peace-enforcement operations include:

- Protection of humanitarian assistance;

- Restoration of order and stability;
- Enforcing sanctions or embargoes;
- Guaranteeing or denying movement;
- Preventing spillover by containing a conflict within a set geographic area;
- Preventing outside intervention;
- Establishment and supervision of protected zones; and,
- Forcible separation of belligerents

The employment of military concepts or ways to help resolve ethnic tensions or violence is not without its difficulties. To craft a successful policy or strategy for intervening in an ethnic conflict requires a blend of military force and diplomacy. If close synchronization of policy and military operations does not occur, then strategic cleavage is likely to develop, with confused policy the result. Indeed, the inability to coordinate the complementary qualities of these elements of national power will, at best, hinder the successful execution of U.S. policy; or, at worst, contribute to a policy failure. Preventing such an outcome will require U.S. policymakers to have a clear vision of the political ends that they want the military to pursue. This will require national and military leaders to overcome the long-standing American tendency to see diplomacy and military force as an "either/or" option.¹²⁹

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

As decisionmakers and their military advisors develop and assess policy options, they will be confronted by conditions that may have implications that are difficult to discern. The reasons for this difficulty are severalfold. First are the numbers of diverse challenges which confront analysts and policymakers. Second, the complexity of issues and their connectivity are significant, and compound exponentially as their numbers increase. Finally, the second and third order effects of these problems may not be readily apparent at the outset of the policy development process, but they will significantly influence

events. A brief survey of a few key points—planning, public support, deterrence, intervention, low intensity conflict, participation in coalitions, and resource costs—offers insights into the difficulties that policymakers may face in their efforts to resolve ethnic conflict in Europe.

Planning.

Planning will have to be accomplished in less than a totally unambiguous environment. Frequently, crises will arrive quickly and require a rapid response in the absence of complete political guidance. Or, because of political and diplomatic conditions, national leaders may not have been able to create the necessary consensus—either internally or with allies—to provide the level of guidance military analysts and planners desire. Civilian and military planners must learn to plan proactively within this type of environment. Developing such initiatives will be possible only if the U.S. policymaking apparatus possesses a detailed working knowledge of the various regions of Europe; of their history, culture, and ethnic composition; and of the interplay of ethnicity and ethnonationalism in the various countries. Analysts will find it especially important to discern the societal and ethnic fracture lines that divide a particular society. Without such specific information, policies and efforts to implement them could be ineffective or, at worst, exacerbate an already volatile situation. The U.S. Government, in general, but particularly the military services must improve their analytical abilities in these key areas.

Public Support.

Because threats to the United States presented by ethnic conflict may not be readily evident to the American public, political leaders may find it difficult to marshal public support for efforts to resolve an ethnic conflict far from America's shores. The fact that many ethnic tensions or conflicts are based on issues unfamiliar to many Americans or follow a logic vastly different from that practiced in U.S. society will exacerbate this difficulty.¹³⁰ Finally, U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of another state is problematic.¹³¹

As a result of these conditions, policymakers may find it difficult to engage the United States early in a conflict when actions are most effective. Indeed, although deterring ethnic conflict is the preferred option, policymakers may be unable to implement proactive policies intended to short-circuit ethnic tensions before they lead to violence. While such investments (either in political or resource capital) may be cost effective in the long run, they require short-term expenditures that the American public may not underwrite unless it can be convinced that early intervention is in U.S. national interests. This will require policymakers to rapidly identify a potential ethnic conflict, clearly articulate why and how U.S. national interests are involved, justify initial expenditures to the public, and sustain long-term support until ethnic tensions have been resolved. This is no easy task, but the effort must be made if preventive initiatives are to succeed.¹³²

Deterrence.

Deterring ethnic violence presents challenges different from past U.S. experience in Europe.¹³³ First, groups prone to ethnic violence do not necessarily share the "culture of deterrence" that developed after the advent of the atomic bomb. Second, because the consequences of ethnic conflict appear minor relative to a nuclear holocaust, ethnic groups may not be deterred from initiating violence. Third, because the ultimate stakes for an individual ethnic group may be high, they are more likely to escalate levels of violence.¹³⁴ Thus, the likelihood of ethnic tensions spilling over into violence is great.

Intervention.

Intervention in an ongoing ethnic conflict or policing the aftermath in another form of peace operations will be even more problematic. Peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations tend to be prolonged. Given the usual conditions surrounding ethnic conflict and the historical propensity of the American public for the application of overwhelming force to achieve rapid and decisive victory, such support may be difficult to sustain.¹³⁵ Even if costs in lives are relatively light, monetary costs, particularly in the current national budget

squeeze, may result in a decline in support before a mission can be successfully concluded. *Prior* to committing U.S. forces, therefore, policymakers must ensure that resources and lives are not expended without a commensurate opportunity for success.

Low Intensity Conflict.

Despite the fact that peace operations (whether peace-making, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement) generally fall on the lower end of the conflict spectrum, intervention in ethnic violence will present challenges different from low intensity conflict of the bipolar era. Leaders as well as followers of ethnic groups see issues largely in zero-sum game terms, are inclined to follow their own, more narrowly focused interests, and may not be amenable to outside pressure. Such conflicts also give scope for local "warlords" or rogue forces, control of which may be tenuous.¹³⁶ And, because violence tends to be directed at all members of an ethnic group regardless of their desired involvement, ethnic conflict frequently results in an increasing spiral of atrocities that motivates individuals to further violence. Finally, because of the emotions involved, agreement at the senior leadership level may not translate into cooperation at the local or individual level where passions tend to run higher.¹³⁷

Coalitions—The Policy Level.

These issues will be further complicated by the U.S. approach of "multilateralism," even if no longer assertive.¹³⁸ First, despite their protestations, many European nations, including close allies, expect the United States to lead such efforts. Indeed, one might conclude that without U.S. leadership, European nations may not be able to arrive at a consensus for action.¹³⁹ Coalition leadership obviously places additional burdens on U.S. officials: e.g., early assessment; rapid decisionmaking; quick responses to rapidly changing events; and, frequently, providing money.

Second, in leading a coalition, the United States must build and sustain consensus, frequently among fractious partners

on policy options, strategic objectives, and the political, economic, diplomatic, and military ways to achieve those ends. This is no easy task. For instance, if the United States has not yet reached internal agreement on its role in the conflict, then it may not be able to build consensus within the coalition. Or, even if the United States has established clearly defined and agreed goals, it may not be able to translate these into universal agreement with its coalition partners. If this occurs, participants in an ethnic conflict can work the fracture lines of the coalition to their advantage, playing off one coalition member against others. This may lead to ethnic groups controlling events rather than the powers supposedly engaged in containing or resolving the conflict controlling them.¹⁴⁰

Resources.

Decisionmakers must ensure that if the United States engages in an ethnic conflict in Europe (regardless of whether it intervenes directly), they must fund supporting military operations. Even the employment of relatively small forces in peace operations may be very costly. For example, incomplete returns place the cost of Rwanda operations (as of August 27, 1994) at roughly \$151 million. Operations to support Haitian refugees have already cost \$230 million in fiscal year 1994 and initial estimates indicate that expanded support of Cuban refugees will cost \$100 million initially, and \$20 million per month. Preliminary estimates for the invasion of Haiti approached \$427 million, and those costs will rise as long as American forces remain in Haiti.¹⁴¹

Funding must also occur in a timely fashion to preclude short-term funding shortfalls that lead to a long-term decline in readiness. For example, in Fiscal Year (FY) 1994, the Department of Defense (DOD) had to absorb \$850 million in additional costs, and that did not include the initial conduct of operations in Haiti.¹⁴² These costs must be absorbed from other DOD programs. And even if funds are later reimbursed in full, rarely will they completely make up deferred training or maintenance opportunities.¹⁴³ Political leaders must ensure that missions and resources remain in balance, or the nation

runs the risk of "overstressing" the military and creating a "hollow" force.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

Because of the violent content of ethnic conflict, U.S. involvement will likely include the employment of military force and forces in some form of peace operations.¹⁴⁴ And, because peace operations rely predominantly on land forces, the U.S. Army has a significant stake in U.S. efforts to deter ethnic violence or intervention in an ongoing conflict.¹⁴⁵ Army leaders and planners, therefore, must be prepared to address a broad range of complex issues. The more important of these issues include, but are not limited to, planning in an ambiguous security environment; cooperation with coalition partners, nongovernmental organizations, and private volunteer organizations (NGOs and PVOs in the current vernacular); force design and force mix within the Active Component of the Army, as well as the Active and Reserve Component mix; doctrine; training; and leader development.

Planning.

Planning frequently will have to be accomplished in an ambiguous environment. Crises will arrive quickly and require a rapid response, often in the absence of complete coalition consensus or U.S. political guidance. Developing concepts and plans will be possible only if military analysts possess a detailed working knowledge of the various regions of Europe; their history, culture, and ethnic composition; and the ethnic lines that divide a particular society. Without such specific information, plans and efforts to implement them could be ineffective, or exacerbate an already volatile situation. Finally, analysts must prepare now for the next crisis. They must identify potential ethnic fracture zones and hot spots, conduct risk analyses, and develop and assess operational concepts.

Coalitions—Military Aspects.

Participation in multilateral diplomatic initiatives will complicate military planning efforts. To simplify complexities,

the United States should continue to insist that NATO act as the lead regional security organization when engaged in operations involving ethnic conflict in Europe. It makes little sense to disregard the body of capabilities that have been built up over the past four decades of NATO experience. Common doctrine, standard operating procedures and techniques, as well as interoperability and a well-established NATO command and control architecture offer significant advantages in the planning, coordination, and execution of operations. Many NATO allies (e.g., Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, and Norway) also have considerable experience with ethnic and sectarian conflict, peacekeeping operations, or peace enforcement from which the U.S. Army could benefit.

Cooperation within NATO is not, however, without its drawbacks. As indicated earlier, a requirement exists to establish and sustain consensus among coalition partners. This applies to the military, as well as the political, level. Within NATO this means creating and maintaining consensus among 16 separate militaries, who frequently have vastly differing national interests and views on actions that the military arm of the Alliance should undertake.¹⁴⁶ On a more practical level, this also will require NATO and the United States to hammer out differences in peace operations doctrine, beginning with the basic definitions that describe the various forms of peace operations.¹⁴⁷ Other arrangements, such as command and control and logistical support using NATO infrastructure and resources also remain to be worked out in finer detail.

If the United States and the U.S. Army participate in coalition operations outside of the NATO structure or include non-NATO nations in such operations, then alternative arrangements, particularly in command and control, have to be constructed. In this case, NATO and its willing partners must have some form of preliminary arrangements worked out. To this end, the United States should continue to support the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, and sustain its strong support to the Combined/Joint Task Force (C/JTF) initiative under development. Policymakers should understand that French objections to elements of the current C/JTF concept (i.e., role of the Supreme Allied Commander [SACEUR], role

of the United States) will complicate implementation of C/JTF for the foreseeable future.¹⁴⁸

NGOs/PVOs.

Nor will cooperative efforts be limited to other governments or militaries. Given the nature of the "global village," and the types of operations in which U.S. forces might be engaged, there is a strong likelihood that U.S. forces will have to coordinate efforts with NGOs and PVOs, which may bring expectations and perceptions to a cooperative effort that differ from those of the U.S. military.¹⁴⁹ While this may sometimes strain working relations, each needs the other and both must be prepared to work for the common good.

The U.S. military can reduce tensions somewhat by emphasizing that U.S. forces are present to assist and support the NGOs/PVOs, not to lead or command them. Commanders should underscore the complementary nature of their organizations, and promote team work that contributes to mission accomplishment of all parties.¹⁵⁰ Indeed, the U.S. military must recognize that NGOs and PVOs can assume a considerable portion of the humanitarian assistance mission, freeing military forces to focus on other operations. Such close cooperation will require the U.S. military to possess an increased awareness of the types and numbers of these organizations. The military must also develop concepts that allow these organizations to meet their own missions while supporting the conduct of military operations. This may require the increased use of civil affairs units to assist in coordination.

Force Design and Mix.

When added to existing operational demands, the potential number and duration of peace operations in Europe runs the risk of overstressing the force. This is generally true of all units, especially given reductions in personnel without a commensurate reduction in missions, but is particularly true of units repetitively tasked to participate in peace operations and operations other than war (e.g., civil affairs, special operations forces, military police, engineers). Indeed, the burden of

participating in peace operations may fall disproportionately upon combat support and combat service support units. Because of increasing automation, reductions, and consolidation of fewer and leaner units at higher echelons of command, combat support and combat service support units are caught between diminishing numbers and increasing demand for their services.

Moreover, European allies and friends are notably deficient in such organizations, and they lack the strategic mobility to deploy the few units available for deployment. Thus, even if the United States does not commit combat forces to a peace operation, there will likely be a necessity for U.S. logistical units to support the efforts of allies. Thus, in either case, excessive demands could be placed on combat support and combat service support forces. At the very least, the Army should begin preparing now for such eventualities.

In its deliberations over Force XXI, therefore, the Army needs to consider closely the requirements of peace operations. For example, are existing units, after appropriate task organization and additional specialized training, sufficient to meet the demands of peace operations? Or should the Army design or designate specific units for such missions? In a constrained fiscal environment, the Army may not be able to field forces optimized to perform peace operations without cutting combat force structure that may be needed to fulfill the Army's responsibilities under the existing national security strategy. But if such units are not created, the Army runs the risk of not having the right amount of the right type forces to perform peace operations necessary to support national policy.¹⁵¹

If the Army determines that specific units are not needed, and relies instead on "tailored" task forces, several salient points require examination. Peace operations tend to be personnel intensive. Granted, some units engaged in peace-enforcement operations will undoubtedly face some modern, mechanized, and armored weaponry, but potential participants in ethnic conflict probably will rely more on infantry forces sited on terrain that is not conducive to mechanized operations. Thus, U.S. forces engaged in ethnic conflicts in

Europe are less likely to focus on the destruction or disruption of an opponent's mechanized forces, as they did in the cold war, and may require substantial numbers of personnel that can be employed on foot.

Given the current focus on mid-intensity conflict that relies heavily on technology and equipment, heavy U.S. armored and mechanized units may not possess adequate numbers of personnel.¹⁵² Also, the use of heavy forces and massive fire power may not serve the political aims of the operation and military ways will have to be subordinated to those political ends. This may cause planners to reconsider manning and equipment choices when designating forces for peace operations.

At the same time, light infantry units, which have a greater "tooth-to-tail" ratio and larger numbers of personnel available for dismounted operations, may not possess sufficient transportation assets to meet the demands of peace operations. Furthermore, units involved in peace operations, where the peace is only tenuously maintained or where conflict may return with little or no notice, may require a considerable complement of armored vehicles and greater combat power than light infantry formations possess. Certainly, units engaged in peace-enforcement operations require the full array of combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities.

When designing force structures, planning operations, and assigning missions, commanders must ensure that adequate numbers of units with the appropriate capabilities are on hand to carry out the myriad and complex tasks demanded by ethnic conflict. If not, subordinate units may find themselves overwhelmed by the numbers of missions that must be executed, much less planned. The increased complexity of these operations under conditions of Operations Other Than War adds further to the stress units undergo. For example, units may have to carry out simultaneously humanitarian assistance operations during the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Or, humanitarian assistance may have to take place while units are actively engaged in peace enforcement operations. This will undoubtedly strain units.

Finally, the Army needs to reexamine the larger issue of whether it has an appropriate number of Active Component units of the type habitually tasked to support peace operations. If sufficient numbers are not available, does the Army then need to alter its current mix of Active Component combat, combat support, and combat service support units? Alternatively, should the Active Component rely more heavily on the combat support and combat service support capabilities and units contained in the Reserve Components? If the Army pursues this option, then legislative relief may be necessary to obtain greater access to Reserve Component units without having to rely on volunteers or a presidential declaration of national emergency. Alternatively, what innovative options could be pursued within the limits of the existing legislation?

Doctrine.

U.S. engagement in ethnic conflict in Europe and the conduct of peace operations also has implications for existing and emerging doctrine. The Army has made great strides in addressing the challenges posed by peace operations (FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*) and "Operations Other Than War" (Chapter 5, FM 100-5, *Operations*). Moreover, the Army also applied FM 100-XX (Draft), *Humanitarian Assistance* and FM 41-XX *Civil-Military Operations Center* (Draft) during recent operations in Rwanda. But the Army is exploring largely uncharted territory and these efforts are only a first step. As an institution, and as individuals, the Army needs to undertake a more thorough exploration of Operations Other Than War and peace operations. For example, the Army may find it profitable to reexamine the lessons distilled (perhaps forgotten, perhaps expunged from memory) from nearly four decades of experience in counter-insurgency warfare, foreign internal defense, and low intensity conflict. Undoubtedly, many of these lessons, some learned at tremendous cost, could be applied to elements of ethnic conflict and peace operations.¹⁵³

At the same time, the Army needs to emphasize the application of current warfighting doctrine to the conduct of peace operations. At first thought, this might seem a contradiction in terms that could conflict with the goals of peace

operations. But this is not the case, and the Army must ensure that its existing doctrine is embedded firmly in the planning and conduct of such missions. In planning for peace operations, the Army needs to establish a theater of operations, develop a theater campaign plan that links military operations to national strategy and policies, carry out intelligence preparation of the area of operations, and apply the operational art of employing military forces to achieve political ends.

Furthermore, planning for peace operations should follow a process similar to planning for combat operations. Military commanders and their staffs need to perform a mission analysis; conduct a commander's and staff estimate of the situation; develop the commander's concept of operations and intent; prepare, approve, and distribute plans and orders; execute operations; and supervise. And, as with the planning and conduct of combat operations, iterative reassessments need to be carried out to ensure that concepts and plans continue to conform to policy and operational requirements.

Training.

New conditions, missions, and doctrine also require a reexamination of the training regimen necessary to support peace operations. Because of the potential for peace operations to escalate rapidly into combat, unit and individual training must still focus on those combat skills necessary to prevail upon the battlefield. Over the past 20 years the Army has garnered considerable expertise in this arena, and this discussion could add little of value. However, a few key issues deserve brief comment.

First, peace operations—even peace enforcement missions—may require *combat skills different* from those needed to meet a mechanized onslaught. The Army must be alert to these differences and ensure that they are incorporated into unit and individual training. The addition of peace operations exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center (Fort Polk, LA) and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (Hohenfels, FRG) are excellent examples of this trend.¹⁵⁴ More attention may be required, however.

Second, planners and analysts need to assess the *specific training* designed to prepare units for the transition from a focus on combat to peace operations. The U.S. Army's experience in preparing units for the Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) mission in the Sinai could serve as a firm foundation to examine such issues. Equally important, training concepts and plans to assist units in the transition from peace operations to full warfighting capabilities need to be refined. Again, FM 100-23 raises this issue,¹⁵⁵ but the subject needs a fuller examination. Finally, the Army needs to think more about how to transition U.S. forces from national or U.S.-led coalition command to control by a multinational headquarters.

Leader development is a third key element. Because of the "gray" nature of many ethnic conflicts, and the difficulties inherent in multinational operations, U.S. Army personnel may have to accommodate themselves to political guidance less specific than they desire. This will affect all levels of decisionmaking and will have wide-ranging effects. On one level, analysts and decisionmakers will require a more sophisticated understanding of the inter-agency process, where they must be able to ask more probing questions of the Army's political masters. They must also participate effectively with the Joint Staff, the Commanders-in-Chief of the unified commands, multinational commanders and staffs, UN agencies and NGOs/PVOs. This education process should begin at the Command and General Staff Officer Course, and should be refined during an officer's Army War College experience. This may require further refinement of the curricula at these two institutions.

At ever lower levels, leaders in the field will require a greater degree of sophistication. Privates and sergeants may be placed in positions requiring decisions or actions of strategic import. Junior officers almost certainly will make decisions that impinge on strategy and policy. Existing training and education programs, especially at the officer and noncommissioned officer basic and advanced courses, must be adjusted to accommodate these new conditions.

Required Army Capabilities.¹⁵⁶

Meeting the demanding requirements of ethnic conflict in Europe will necessitate that the U.S. Army possess a number of capabilities. Many of these requirements are familiar, a few will be new, and others will simply be unfamiliar. Indeed, the first capability may be the ability to separate the new from the unfamiliar. The limited discussion that follows is not intended to be inclusive. Nor does it provide detailed discussion of how such capabilities could be generated or how they should be employed. Rather, the discussion is designed to stimulate thought. Capabilities include:

- Full participation in the JCS and inter-agency policy development process. This implies that the Army must have the necessary personnel in appropriate positions with the requisite knowledge and skills (both bureaucratic and regional expertise) for effective participation in these fora. This includes not only the Army Staff, but also Army personnel on the Joint Staff, within the inter-agency process, and on the staffs of the unified commands. This ability may be circumscribed, somewhat, by existing legislation that limits the role of the services.
- A trained and ready force, prepared for short-notice, worldwide deployment, across a broad spectrum of combat missions, peace operations, and Operations Other Than War.
- Because the Army is now predominantly based in the continental United States, it must be able to deploy anywhere in the world, on little or no notice. For the primary means of transportation, the Army relies on the Air Force and the Navy. On its own part, the Army must have units prepared for deployment, the capability to move expeditiously from home station to air and sea ports of embarkation, and the logistical capabilities to sustain the prolonged deployment of the force. To ensure these capabilities the Army must have an appropriate mix of land and maritime based

prepositioned stocks, rapidly deployable units, and forward presence forces in Europe.

- A forward presence in Europe that can reassure, deter, contain and, if necessary, intervene in ethnic crises or conflicts. This may require the temporary stationing of forces outside of Western Europe, where U.S. forces traditionally have been employed. Indeed, if they participate in preventive diplomatic efforts, U.S. forces may be found throughout much of Central or Eastern Europe.
- Army forces must be capable of integrating into multinational force structures—established organizations such as NATO, as well as ad hoc organizations that may or may not be organized around the U.S. C/JTF concept. Units must be able to interface with nongovernmental organizations in a manner that supports the missions of all organizations.
- A force structure and force design that provides sufficient numbers of forces to operate across a broad spectrum of operations in peacetime, crisis, and war, and the flexibility to operate in all three environments simultaneously. For example,
 - The ability to provide medical care to support humanitarian relief or peace operations, while continuing to support peacetime active duty and family member medical needs.
 - Adequate numbers of specialized combat support and combat service support units and personnel (e.g., special operations forces, engineers, military police, civil affairs, psychological operations) to avoid overstressing limited resources.
 - Combat support and combat service support force structure capable of supporting sustained peace operations, while concurrently supporting a limited lesser regional contingency.

-
- Sufficient combat support and combat service support capacity to execute transfer of forces from peace operations to full scale combat operations, while supporting the movement of forces to a major regional contingency.
 - Sufficient forces to meet anticipated peace operations missions, while maintaining the ability to execute one Major Regional Contingency (MRC) and one Lesser Regional Contingency (LRC) as envisaged under the National Military Strategy. These forces must also be able to conduct multiple concurrent peace operations, as well as rotate forces involved in protracted peace operations. This will require increased access to the Reserve Components.
 - A detailed understanding of Europe, its regions, cultures, ethnic composition, historical circumstances and contemporary contentious issues, as well as an understanding of ethnicity, ethnonationalism, ethnic conflict, and how these issues can adversely affect stability in Europe. This will require the Army to revitalize and sustain its Foreign Area Officer program, with particular attention devoted to the newly independent nations of the former Soviet Union.
 - A leader development program, that ensures:
 - At the strategic level, the ability to assist in the formulation and execution of national policy, as well as the development of military strategic plans to implement policy.
 - At the operational level, the ability to develop, plan and execute military operations, whether combat, peace, or other than war, to achieve national objectives.
 - The development of negotiating skills to participate in crisis management, to act as intermediary between sides of a conflict, or to serve as an interface between U.S. military participants and NGOs/PVOs.

- Greater foreign language capability throughout the force.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Given current U.S. foreign policies, America will remain engaged in European affairs.¹⁵⁷ Because of the ability of ethnic conflict to place U.S. interests in Europe at risk, the United States will continue to be involved in the prevention and resolution of ethnic conflict. To respond effectively to these conflicts, the United States must develop a coherent approach to dealing with ethnic conflict within Europe. This will require the U.S. Government and the U.S. Armed Forces to undertake a number of initiatives:

- The United States must clearly define, and more importantly clearly articulate to the American public, U.S. interests in Europe, how ethnic conflict endangers those interests, and the consequences of intervention or abstention.
- Policymakers must have a clear vision of not just what the United States *can* do, but what the United States is *willing* to do.
- Political leaders must establish clear, achievable political objectives that permit the development of military objectives, plans, and operations to achieve those political goals.
- The American public and its elected representatives in Congress must be persuaded to fund programs that provide long-term benefit, without necessarily seeing short-term results. This must be accomplished in a time of shrinking budgets, when Americans will undoubtedly question such expenditures. Nonetheless, these steps, however difficult, offer the greatest likelihood for long-term resolution of ethnic conflict, and are much more cost effective than later military intervention.
- U.S. policymakers must improve their knowledge of ethnicity and ethnic identity and understand the critical

role these ideas play in determining internal, foreign, and security policies in Europe.

While each conflict is unique and therefore requires its own unique solution, policymakers must understand that events in Europe are interrelated and require a holistic approach that integrates individual issues. When tackling these challenges, therefore, U.S. policymakers must take a broad, encompassing approach to what appear to be separate and unrelated conflicts. Taking each crisis as a single and unrelated entity frequently results in a disjointed approach that inhibits development of a coherent U.S. European policy.

This will also require the United States to define other, far-reaching policies beyond the relatively narrow, but important, confines of ethnic conflict in Europe. For example, the United States must not only concern itself with ethnic conflict in the Transcaucasus, but also with larger issues: how should the United States treat Russian "peacekeeping" activities in the so-called "near abroad"? Or, more generally, what should be U.S. policy toward Russia? Equally important for the prevention of ethnic conflict in Central and Eastern Europe is the question: at what pace should NATO membership expand into Central and Eastern Europe? Which nations should join and in what priority? Similarly, while U.S. participation in efforts to resolve the ongoing civil war in Yugoslavia are important, what is the U.S. policy toward the Balkans, as a whole, and how is it integrated with policies for the remainder of Europe? (For example, U.S. policy in the current crisis in the former Yugoslavia extends far beyond the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Relations have been strained with our allies in Western Europe [British, French, Dutch], critical allies in Southeastern Europe [Greece and Turkey], and new friends in Eastern Europe [Russia, Ukraine].)

In developing policy options to address these issues, policymakers must carefully integrate all elements of national power. This will require a thorough blending of diplomacy and force; these two elements cannot be artificially divorced. Policymakers, for instance, must not rely too heavily on military options, and must be willing to pursue alternatives that integrate all elements of national power. Political leaders must

be willing to take the time necessary for these initiatives to work. At the same time, while recognizing that military force alone will not resolve the underlying causes of the conflict, the military must be willing to use force to complement or reinforce diplomatic activities. If U.S. policy concerning ethnic conflict in Europe is to be a success, it must rely, to a degree at least, on the use of military power.

The United States cannot afford ad hoc and improvised responses to crises.¹⁵⁸ To prevent "ad hocery" the United States must develop a sound and rigorous policymaking apparatus and process, and adhere to it. The inter-agency process must be made to work routinely in an effective manner. This organization and process must ensure the coherency of policies and assure that one initiative does not upset the equilibrium of U.S.-European relations in another portion of the Continent. Finally, analysts must prepare *now* for the next crisis. They must identify potential fracture zones or ethnic hotspots, develop and assess potential policy options, and conduct risk analyses.

Europe is a large and diverse continent, and the United States does not have the resources to do everything, everywhere, every time. Policymakers, therefore, must establish priorities for U.S. action. Ethnic conflict (actual or potential) which would place U.S. interests at gravest risk is most evident in Central Europe, Southeastern Europe (to include the Balkans), and Eastern Europe. Precluding the spread of the ongoing war in Yugoslavia and peacefully resolving that conflict, while deterring ethnic violence in other portions of the region, rank high with the current administration.¹⁵⁹ Stability in the emerging democracies of Central Europe is a major interest. Obviously, promoting stability by avoiding ethnically based conflict in the European portions of the former Soviet Union, particularly Ukraine and Russia, also is in U.S. national interests.

Moreover, priority should go to peaceful amelioration of conflict. This will require proactive initiatives on the part of the U.S. Government, as well as forward thinking in the Washington policy formulation apparatus and a considerable degree of diplomatic finesse.

Proactive Policy Initiatives

The brief, illustrative example that follows elaborates on proactive initiatives that might be available to U.S. policymakers. The example assumes that ethnic tensions in Ukraine between Ukrainians and Ukraine's substantial ethnic Russian population are rising.

On the diplomatic front, the United States could support peacemaking efforts under the auspices of the CSCE or the U.N. U.S. support could include strategic and theater level airlift, logistics, CSI, or, if conditions warranted, ground forces. The United States could also mediate critical issues such as the division of the Black Sea Fleet, the dispute over Crimea, and Ukrainian-Russian differences over transfer payments. At the same time, the United States could press Ukrainian compliance with existing arms control treaties—particularly START I and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—which would ease Russian concerns about Ukrainian intentions.

On the economic level, the United States could encourage Ukrainian compliance with International Monetary Fund (IMF) requirements for reform of the Ukrainian economy. In return, the United States could encourage the IMF to be more forthcoming with aid. Concomitantly, the United States, in conjunction with its European allies, could offer Ukraine further credits or loan guarantees. Equally important, the United States and its EU trading partners could offer Ukraine trade incentives that open their markets to Ukrainian goods. Finally, under U.S. leadership, concerned states could broaden Ukrainian sources of energy related products.

Should peaceful efforts at conflict resolution fail, U.S. interests may call for the use of military force. *Prior* to committing military force, however, policymakers need to consider the following key questions:¹⁶⁰

- Is there a threat to regional or international peace and security?
- What are the desired political objectives to be achieved?
- What is the desired end state?
- Have viable alternatives to the use of military forces been pursued?
- What are the appropriate military ends, ways, and means to achieve the political objectives?

-
- How long and to what extent is the United States willing to commit forces to the region?
 - Will the American public continue to support such a commitment if it includes the prolonged deployment of ground forces?
 - Is the United States willing to engage sufficient forces to achieve decisive military and political results?
 - Are the political objectives in balance with the potential expenditure of national treasure and lives?

If these questions cannot be answered adequately, U.S. forces should not be employed. And, even if policymakers initially ascertain satisfactory answers, these questions will require continuous reexamination throughout the deployment of U.S. forces to ensure the continued coincidence of U.S. national policies and the military means to achieve them. If such a reexamination does not occur, a strong possibility exists that a strategic cleavage between political objectives and military ends, ways, and means will result, with the potential policy failure a likely result.

In the end, U.S. participation in ethnic conflicts in Europe is fraught with difficulties and dangers. Nonetheless, U.S. interests may drive the United States into engaging in such ventures. When preparing to participate, whether politically or militarily, in efforts to resolve ethnic conflict, the best that U.S. policymakers can probably hope to accomplish is to:

- Recognize where ethnic conflict may arise in Europe.
- Establish what, if any, U.S. interests are at stake.
- Assess the importance of those interests versus potential expenditure of American lives and national treasure.
- Identify steps or policies that might deter violence.
- Build coalitions to implement policies.

-
- Contain the violence and achieve conflict termination at the earliest opportunity if violence occurs.
 - Devise policy options that integrate political, economic, diplomatic, and military elements of national power that seek to redress the underlying political, economic, and societal sources of ethnic conflict.
 - Recognize the limits of the United States and its allies, and understand that, occasionally, there may be little that outside intervention in an ethnic crisis or conflict can accomplish.

ENDNOTES

1. As with many labels, ethnic conflict is neither all inclusive nor wholly accurate—but it does generally apply to current conditions in Europe. Others may use the term intra-state conflict, but this fails to address satisfactorily the issue of irredenta. Also this monograph focuses on the ethnic content of conflict and violence. Thus, ethnic conflict will be the general term applied.

2. John Chipman, "Managing the Politics of Parochialism," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1993, p. 143. Interestingly, Monty G. Marshall points out that this phenomenon caught western social scientists completely off guard. See, "States at Risk: Ethnopolitics in the Multinational States of Eastern Europe," in Ted R. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993, p. 173.

3. As conflict in the Transcaucasus (Azeri versus Armenian; South Ossetian or Abkhazian versus Georgian) or in the Trans-Dnester region of Moldova that has resulted in Russian presence in these areas amply illustrates.

4. Even though ethnic conflict was rare in Europe during the cold war, worldwide the phenomenon was fairly common. As David C. Rapoport points out, over 40 ethnically based rebellions occurred in the period 1960-90. David C. Rapoport, "The Role of External Forces Supporting Ethno-Religious Conflict," in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., eds., *Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions* [hereafter cited as Pfaltzgraff and Schultz, eds., *Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability*], Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, p. 63.

5. See, for example, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 1994, p. 64. The hierarchy of U.S. national interests: survival, vital, major, and peripheral is taken from Donald Nuechterlein, *America Overcommitted: United States Interests in the 1980s*, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985, Chapter 1.

6. This capacity may be waning with the realization of the costs—measured in scarce resources and lives—involved in such interventions, as well as their increasing frequency. See, for example, Eric Schmitt, "Military's Growing Role in Relief Missions Prompts Concerns," *The New York Times*, July 31, 1994, p. A3; Bradley Graham, "Aid Missions May Force Defense Cuts, Perry Says," *The Washington Post*, August 5,

1994, p. A27; and Ken Adelman, "Dialing 911 for the Military," *The Washington Times*, August 12, 1994, p. 19.

7. See *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 1994, [hereafter cited as *NSS*], pp. 21-23. Moreover, in the five fiscal quarters ending in the third quarter 1993, trade between the United States and Europe came to nearly \$299 billion. Statistics compiled from International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics*, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, March 1994, p. 134.

8. For example, the inability of the European Union (EU), Western European Union (WEU), or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to cope with the current spate of ethnically-motivated conflicts in Europe.

9. As Donald Horowitz points out, this condition, when combined with the open nature of American society and cultural development may, "...disqualify us from understanding much of what is going on in the [ethnic] world." Donald Horowitz, "Ethnic Conflict: The Known and the Unknown," paper presented at the Defense Intelligence College Conference, Ethnic Conflict: Challenge to U.S. Security?, June 23, 1992, p. 3.

10. Subject matter experts may be more inclined to substitute the French term *ethnie* for ethnic identity or group because *ethnie* "unites an emphasis upon cultural differences with a sense of an historical community. It is this sense of history and the perception of cultural uniqueness and individuality which differentiates populations from each other and which endows a given population with a definite identity, both in their own eyes and in those of outsiders." Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 21-22. The more common nomenclature, ethnic identity, will be used in this report, however.

11. James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991, p. 5. [emphasis added] At first glance, this definition may not appear to be very helpful. But, it underscores the fact that *a sense of belonging* is the elemental force that binds together members of an ethnic group.

12. In De Vos' words, ethnicity consists of the "subjective, symbolic, or emblematic use by a group of people . . . of any aspect of culture, in order to differentiate themselves from other groups." George De Vos, "Ethnic Pluralism" in George De Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross, eds., *Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change*, Palo Alto: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1976, p. 16, cited in Paul R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1991, p. 19. See also Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 28.

13. According to Webster's, a clan is "a social unit smaller than a tribe and larger than the family and claiming descent from a common ancestor." Philip B. Gove, ed. in chief, *Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language*, Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, Inc., 1986, p. 415. "Theoretically, a clan embraces the descendants of a single ancestor or ancestress, the sense of the common descent leading to the rule of exogamy." Edwin R.A. Seligman, ed. in chief, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, New York: The MacMillan Co., 1950, Vol. 14, p. 142.

14. J.S. Coleman, *Nigeria, Background to Nationalism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958, Appendix, quoted in Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 180.

15. See, for example, Anthony Smith's discussion of ethnies, myths, and symbols, in Smith, *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*, pp. 13-16.

16. The example of Croats and Serbs in the former Yugoslavia is an excellent example.

17. "Races," as James Kellas points out, "are discussed predominantly in biological terms, with particular emphasis on 'phenotypical' distinctions such as skin color, stature, etc., and presumed genetic distinctions." Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, p. 5. Phenotypical distinctions are not without their controversies, however.

18. See, for example, Andrew Nagorski and Theresa Waldrop, "The Laws of Blood," *Newsweek*, June 14, 1993, pp. 38-39; and Marc Fisher, "Germans Ponder: What Does It Mean to Be German?," *The Washington Post*, June 28, 1993, p. A1.

19. For a discussion of these differences and how they contribute to ethnic identity, see William T. Johnsen, *Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 1993, chapter 3.

20. The terms "nation" and "state" require amplification. In the United States, the two terms are used interchangeably, but, in fact, they are not synonymous. Indeed, the terms take on important distinctions, especially in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. According to Hugh Seton-Watson, a noted scholar of nationalism, "A state is a legal and political organization, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens." On the other hand, he defines a nation as "... a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness." H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Inquiry Into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977, p. 1. Thus, while it may be possible for a "nation" to conform to the territory of the "state" (hence the term nation-state), habitually they do not. Indeed, attempts over the centuries to make nations

(i.e., a community of people) coincide with the geographic boundaries of a state (i.e., a political entity) are the root cause of many past, present, and future ethnic conflicts in Europe.

21. As examples in the former Yugoslavia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Moldova illustrate, this is not simply a theoretical issue.

22. Smith, *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*, pp. 22-31.

23. An excellent description of such migrations and their influences on the Balkan region can be found in Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. 1, *Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 1-38. For a detailed study of the region and the ebb and flow of historical currents, see Traiann Stoianovich, *A Study in Balkan Civilization*, New York: Knopf, 1967.

24. The precise provision was: "cuius regio, eius religio," literally "his the land, his the religion." See Robert R. Palmer and Joel Colton, *A History of the Modern World*, 5th ed., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, p. 70-88, for a description of the events of the Protestant Reformation and its immediate consequences.

25. As Gerard Chaliand points out, until the full flower of the mid-19th century, minorities within Europe were based on religious affiliation, not ethnic origin. Gerard Chaliand, "Minorities," paper presented at the Defense Intelligence College Conference, Ethnic Conflict: Challenge to U.S. Security?, June 23, 1992, p. 1.

26. Epitomized by France under Louis XIV (1643-1715) and the United Kingdom culminating with the Act of Union of 1701. See Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Chapters 6 and 7, for a detailed discussion of the role of ethnicity in the formation of nation-states. For a specific discussion of the development of various nation-states in Europe, see Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry Into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, Boulder, Chapters 2, 3, and 4.

27. Anthony Smith defines nationalism as: "an ideological movement, for the attainment of and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential 'nation' like others." Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 171.

28. Russia in the first case, the Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* (1867) in the second instance, and the slow death of the Ottoman Empire in the last case.

29. Examples of Great Power domination abound, but the most obvious may be the Congress of Berlin (1878) that overturned the Treaty of San

Stefano and resulted in bruised feelings of all the lesser Balkan powers. The division of Albania among Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia at the same conference is a pertinent example of the latter trait.

30. These settlements and the "Versailles system" incorporate more than simply the Treaty of Versailles (June 1919) between the Allies and the United States and Germany. Also included are: The Treaty of Saint-Germain (September 1919) with Austria, the Treaty of Neuilly (November 1919) with Bulgaria, the Treaty of Trianon (June 1920) with Hungary, and the Treaty of Sèvres (August 1920) with Turkey which was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne (July 1923). For a brief synopsis of the provisions of each treaty see, William L. Langer, *An Encyclopedia of World History*, 5th ed., Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1972, pp. 977-979, 1085-1086.

31. See the memoirs and exposes of various participants: Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking, 1919*, New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1965; Charles Seymour, *Letters from the Paris Peace Conference*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965; Edward House and Charles Seymour, eds., *What Really Happened at Paris: The Peace Conference*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921; or Sir James Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference*, London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1972.

32. Note, for example, the Curzon Line that set the eastern boundary of Poland, the boundaries of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, or Romania. For an example of Allied leaders on all fours examining maps, see Daniel P. Moynihan, *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 102.

33. For example, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was a marriage of convenience to prevent those smaller states from being swallowed up by Italy or Hungary. For a discussion of the details of this "shotgun" marriage, see L.S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1454*, New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1958, p. 618; Gale Stokes, "The Role of the Yugoslav Committee in the Formation of Yugoslavia," in *The Creation of Yugoslavia: 1914-1918*, ed. Djordjevic, Santa Barbara, CLID Books, 1980; James Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," *Survival*, Vol. 33, No. 4, July-August 1992, p. 292; Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, *Twentieth Century*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 145-146.

34. The German question has concerned Europe since the breakup of the Holy Roman Empire. Europeans, and especially Germans, struggle to determine how to accommodate all ethnic Germans within a single state, and the role of that state within the European state system. For a brief historical description, see William Pfaff, *The Wrath of Nations*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993, p. 42.

35. Longer, and differing, treatments of Hitler's motives and ethnic concerns can be found in Christopher Thorne, *The Approach of War, 1938-1939*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967; and A.J.P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, 2d ed., Fawcett Premier, 1961. More concise treatments can be found in H.W. Koch, "Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War: Second Thoughts on the Status of Some Documents"; and Alan Bullock, "Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War"; both in Esmonde M. Robertson, ed., *The Origins of the Second World War*, London: The MacMillan Press, 1979, pp. 159-188 and pp. 189-224, respectively.

36. Numerous excellent accounts of the Holocaust exist. See, for example, Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *The War Against the Jews*, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1975. For a review of Hitler's views on Jews, see pp. 3-28.

37. See, for example, Paul Goble's argument in "Ethnicity as Explanation, Ethnicity as Excuse," in Pfaltzgraff and Schultz, Jr., eds., *Ethnic Conflict and Regional Stability*, p. 52.

38. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, *The Ethnic Question*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1990, p. 5.

39. Though, as Steven Metz cogently points out, primitive weapons have exacted a terrible toll in Rwanda. See Steven Metz, *Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning from Rwanda*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 9, 1994, pp. 6-7.

40. Thus, military practitioners require an understanding of the underlying causes of conflict regardless of whether involved in peaceful observation of events, peacekeeping operations, or the enforced separation of belligerents.

41. Chipman, "Managing the Politics of Parochialism," p. 145.

42. Stavenhagen, *The Ethnic Question*, p. 77.

43. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, p. 34; Stavenhagen, *The Ethnic Question*, pp. 52-64; and Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, pp. 181-205.

44. Horowitz, "Ethnic Conflict: Known and Unknown," pp. 12, 15.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

46. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, pp. 41, 43-46, 71 and 82-86; Susan Woodward, "The Balkans and Europe: Euro-Atlantic Security and Values," in Pfaltzgraff and Shultz, eds., *Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability*, p.

234; and the detailed discussion contained in Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, pp. 105-135.

47. For a brief discussion of these issues, see Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, pp. 105-135.

48. An excellent example of this can be found in the former Yugoslavia, where Croatia and Slovenia were more commercially and industrially developed than their Serbian neighbors, and resented the government's transfer of wealth to Serbia. At the same time, Serbians resented the greater relative affluence of their ethnically different neighbors. While not a sole cause of the outbreak of violence, these cleavages contributed to increased ethnic tensions as the Yugoslav economy went sour in the 1980s. See, for example, Woodward, "The Balkans and Europe: Euro-Atlantic Security and Values," pp. 233-235.

49. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, pp. 147-149, and 166-171.

50. Rita Jalali and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Racial and Ethnic Conflicts: A Global Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 107, No. 4, Winter 1992/1993, pp. 591 and 595ff. One need only look at the recent ethnic tensions generated by the large numbers of "guest workers" or immigrants to Western Europe, particularly Germany and France. See, for example, DDP/ADN (Berlin), December 25, 1993, "Illegal Immigration Unabated Despite New Law," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS]-WEU-93-246*, December 27, 1993, p. 23; and *Le Monde*, January 18, 1994, p. 14, in "Pasqua Forms Special Immigration Police Force," in *FBIS-WEU-94-045*, March 8, 1994, p. 35-36, respectively. For an overall view of immigration to Western Europe and its consequences, see David Coleman, "Western Europe: A Region of Mass Migration?," in *Western Europe, 1993*, 2d ed., London: European Publications, Ltd., 1993, pp. 57-67.

51. For a discussion of these issues, see Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, pp. 101-105. See also Goble, "Ethnicity as Explanation, Ethnicity as Excuse," p. 53. Interestingly, John Chipman points out that one can never be sure when that last straw will occur: "Different ethnic or national groups can live intermingled or side by side for many years, and yet when certain individual, political, social, economic, linguistic, religious, or even environmental rights cannot be defended or advanced through any other instrument, ethnic conflicts emerge." John Chipman, "Managing the Politics of Parochialism," p. 143.

52. As Horowitz points out, "In a significant way, in fact, self-determination is the problem and not the solution,...." Horowitz, "Ethnic Conflict: The Known and Unknown," p. 24.

53. Wilson's Fourteen Points may be found in Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna*, New York: Harper and Row, 1973, pp. 353-354.

54. When these two circumstances are combined, as in the former Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union, unleashed ethnonationalist forces can be significant. See Richard H. Shultz, "Conflict Resolution: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Assistance Missions," in Pfaltzgraff and Schultz, eds., *Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability*, p. 303; and Barry Posen, "Realist Theory and the Assessment of Ethnic Conflict," typescript, June 29, 1992, p.1. See also, Charles Fairbanks, "The Effects of Ethnic/Religious Conflict on U.S. Interests: A Global Assessment," paper presented at the National Strategy Information Center Conference on the Impact of Ethnic and Religious Conflict on U.S. Interests, June 3, 1993.

55. While the Northern Italian Lega is predominantly a result of economic disparities (industrial vs. agrarian), it does contain an ethnic element that conforms to Horowitz's "backward vs. advanced" model. See Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, pp. 167-171.

56. John Coakley, "Introduction: Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict," in John Coakley, ed., *The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict*, London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1993, p. 2.

57. For a brief explication of these issues, see Horowitz, "Ethnic Conflict: The Known and the Unknown," pp. 16-24. It is also important to remember that many ethnic groups, even those in industrial or semi-industrial states, still practice small scale agriculture and have strong ties to the land. Bosnia-Herzegovina is an excellent example. The Croats are more industrialized, the Muslims have long been commercially oriented, and the Serbs have remained tied to the land; thus, the Serbian quest for territory out of proportion to their population.

58. See, for example, Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, "The Implications of German Unification for Western Europe," in Paul B. Stares, ed., *The New Germany and the New Europe*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1992, pp. 265-268; William Drozdiak, "Less Ambitious European Union Looks East," *The Washington Post*, March 10, 1994, p. A38; and Pierre Lellouche in "French-German Opposition on EU Future Viewed," *FBIS-WEU-94-199*, October 14, 1994, pp. 38-39.

59. Eric Kraemer offers another spectrum of conflict based on the level of violence: little or no violence; low, intermittent violence; moderate violence; high violence; and very high violence. Eric Kraemer, "Global Assessment of Current and Future Trends in Ethnic/Religious Conflict," paper presented at the National Strategy Information Center Conference on The Impact of Ethnic and Religious Conflict on U.S. Interests, June 3, 1993, p. 11.

60. See, for example, Marc Fisher, "Germany's Turks Erupt with Pent-Up Anger," *The Washington Post*, June 2, 1993, p. A21. For the rise of racism in Europe, see Stavenhagen, *The Ethnic Question*, pp. 120-128.

61. ETA assassinations continue. See, Madrid Teletexto TVE, June 1, 1994, in "Defense Minister Urges Public to Fight Terrorism," *FBIS-WEU-94-106*, June 2, 1994, p. 33. The Corsican Armed Revolutionary Front announced in February 1993 that it was suspending its bombing campaign. See, AFP (Paris) February 18, 1993, in "Corsican Separatist Group Announces End to Violence," *FBIS-WEU-93-032*, February 19, 1993, p. 35.

62. See, for example, Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, pp. 29-48; Karen Breslau, "Will Kosovo Be Next?," *Newsweek*, August 31, 1992, p. 50; or J.F.O. McAllister, "Ever Greater Serbia," *Time*, September 28, 1992, pp. 55-56.

63. Points addressed in this section have been taken, adapted, and expanded from Major General William A. Stofft and Gary L. Guertner, *Ethnic Conflict: Implications for the Army of the Future*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, pp. 4-9.

64. Provisions for greater autonomy among the constituent ethnic groups of Belgium (Flemings, Walloons, Luxembourgers, and the capital region) and Basques and Catalans in Spain are prominent examples. For a detailed discussion of the peaceful pursuit of ethnic conflict, see Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, pp. 93-122. Gurr also points out that even when the appropriate political processes are not available, violence is not inevitable. For example, the USSR and the former Yugoslavia faced similar conditions in 1991, but Soviet leaders chose decentralization and, perhaps, democracy, while Serbian leaders chose to fight rather than negotiate. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

65. Examples of the former two are riots by Turkish workers in Germany protesting right-wing violence against their presence. See, for example, Fisher, "Germany's Turks Erupt with Pent-Up Anger," p. A21.

66. Such a potential and requirement were demonstrated when the U.S.S. *Harlan County* arrived off Port-au-Prince, Haiti, in October 1993. Had the Haitian thugs waited until the unarmed civil police and military trainers had disembarked, a deadly confrontation could have ensued. Moreover, the strategic damage to U.S. foreign policy was significant. For a brief account of events on October 11, 1993, and their fallout, see Donald E. Schulz and Gabriel Marcella, *Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for U.S. Policy Toward Haiti*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, pp. 1-2.

67. Russians under the Tsars and Soviets after the revolution introduced ethnic Russians into newly incorporated areas as a means of

solidifying central control along the edges of their respective empires. As a result, substantial Russian minorities now live outside Russia.

68. Even when states dissolve, whether peacefully or violently, it is important to understand that rarely are the breaks clean. As Hungarian minorities in the Slovak Republic, the large numbers of ethnic Russians stranded outside of Russia, and the melange of ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia amply illustrate, few if any splinter states will be ethnically homogeneous.

69. Stofft and Guertner, *Ethnic Conflict*, p. 7.

70. Within Europe, this condition can be traced to the seemingly endless transfer of territory that followed in the wake of centuries of warfare, but especially to the aftermath of World Wars I and II.

71. The examples of potential irredenta are legion: Hungary and all its neighbors, all of the states surrounding Macedonia which lost after its territory, ethnic Germans in the Czech Republic or Poland, intermingled minorities in the Baltic States, etc.

72. This is particularly true of Ukraine with its large ethnic Russian population that opted for Ukrainian citizenship in hopes of economic promise that have gone unfulfilled, and now casts longing eyes at the Russian economy that is outpacing Ukraine's. See, Steven Erlanger, "Ukrainians Elect A New President," *The New York Times*, July 12, 1994, p. A1, or Misha Glenny, "Ukraine's Great Divide," *The Washington Post*, July 14, 1994, p. A23.

73. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 282. For example, even Serbia has been reluctant to call publicly for the joining of Bosnian Serbs to Serbia. And, the increasing pressure on Serbia from the international community has apparently affected Serbian support of its Bosnian kinsmen. See John Pomfret, "Milosevic Threatens Bosnian Serbs," *The Washington Post*, August 3, 1994, p. A22, and Chuck Sudetic, "Belgrade Issues Warning to Bosnian Serbs," *The New York Times*, August 3, 1994, p. A10.

74. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 284; and pp. 285-288.

75. For example, the ETA in Spain, Corsican separatists in France, and the IRA in the United Kingdom.

76. The bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in February 1993 may have awakened the United States, but terrorist activities within the United States are still relatively rare by world standards.

77. The Russian failure in Afghanistan, the French failures in Indochina and Algeria, the U.S. failure in Vietnam, and the British experience in Northern Ireland are examples.

78. For more details, see Stofft and Guertner, *Ethnic Conflict*, p. 5.

79. For example, provisions in the UN Charter proscribing interference in the sovereign rights of states. Chapter 1, Article 2, paragraph 7.

80. The current impasse within Europe over the former Yugoslavia is an excellent example. Serbs are ethnically Slavs and Orthodox Christians and have close ties to Russia. Serbs also have long-standing political connections with France. The United States has large ethnic Greek, Croat, and Serb communities which influence internal public opinion. Germany tends to favor Croatia and Slovenia because of past ties. At the same time, past German actions in the Balkans have alienated many of the participants in the region.

81. For example, Steven Cimbala pointed out in a survey of 21 civil wars, that 6 were resolved through negotiation and 13 were resolved by capitulation (6) or expulsion/extermination (7) "Collective Security and Escalation Insecurity: Perils for Crisis Management and Peace-keeping (Discussion Draft)," undated, pp. 9-10.

82. Brian Nichiporuk, RAND Study, forthcoming. Some examples have been adapted to conform to this report's focus on Europe.

83. Trent Thomas, "Global Assessment of Current and Future Trends in Ethnic and Religious Conflict," in Pfaltzgraff and Shultz, eds., *Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability*, p. 39.

84. See, for example, Steven Metz, "Deterring Conflict Short of War," *Strategic Review*, Vol. 22, No. 4, Fall 1994, pp. 48-49.

85. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, indexed version, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, Book 1, Chapter 1, paragraph 3, p. 76. For Clausewitz's discussion of the passion of the people, see also *Ibid.*, Book 6, Chapter 26, pp. 592-593.

86. Thomas, "Global Assessment of Current and Future Trends in Ethnic and Religious Conflict," pp. 39-40.

87. For an interesting and stark view of the emergence of warrior classes, see Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class," *Parameters*, Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer 1994.

88. Rapoport, "The Role of External Forces in Supporting Ethno-Religious Conflict," p. 62.

89. *Ibid.*

90. For example, British and French forces in the former Yugoslavia seem to be succumbing to this condition, and their respective governments appear less and less willing to assume an open-ended commitment. See, for instance, Srecko Latal, "Bosnian Truce Proclaimed; Britain Hints of a Pullout," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, July 13, 1994, p. 6; and Alexander MacLeod, "Britain, France Threaten to Pull Troops From Bosnia," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 12, 1994, p. 3. Nor is the United States immune. Although not involved in peacekeeping missions, per se, humanitarian assistance operations are taking their toll on the U.S. military. See Eric Schmitt, "Military's Growing Role in Relief Missions Prompts Concerns," *The New York Times*, July 31, 1994, p. A3; Bradley Graham, "Aid Missions May Force Defense Cuts, Perry Says," *The Washington Post*, August 5, 1994, p. A27; and Ken Adelman, "Dialing 911 for the military," *The Washington Times*, August 12, 1994, p. 19. Nor are requirements likely to subside any time soon. See, John Darton, "U.N. Faces Refugee Crisis That Never Ends," *The New York Times*, August 8, 1994, p. A1.

91. Thomas, "Global Assessment of Current and Future Trends in Ethnic and Religious Conflict," p. 40.

92. Rapoport, "The Role of External Forces in Supporting Ethno-Religious Conflict," p. 61. On the other hand, long-lasting or successful ethnic conflicts seldom occur without an adjacent state with co-ethnics. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

93. Alexis Heraclides, "Historical and Contemporary Assessment of How States Use Secessionist/Ethnic Movements to Achieve Political Objectives," paper presented at the National Strategy Information Center Conference on the Impact of Ethnic and Religious Conflict on U.S. Interests, June 3, 1993, p. 15.

94. *NSS*, p. 10, lays out excellent criteria for such an assessment.

95. See Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., ed., Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993, pp. 3-8. Objectives, concepts, and resources are also described as ends, ways, and means. Because of length constraints and limited subject matter expertise, a discussion of means is omitted from this study.

96. *NSS*, pp. 21-23.

97. See, for example, President Clinton's Address to the National Assembly, Paris, France, June 7, 1994, in "Securing Peace and Prosperity in a Broader Europe," U.S. Department of State *Dispatch*, Vol. 5, No. 24, June 13, 1994, pp. 381-383.

98. Such a possibility is not unique to ethnic conflict; the potential exists in many policy options. U.S. involvement in Vietnam in the 1950s-1970s is an excellent example.

99. For example, few Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland remember that the British Army intervened in 1969 to protect the Catholic population of Ulster. U.S. forces in Somalia quickly came under fire from various factions in Somalia, and the local population quickly turned to throwing rocks whenever Americans left their compounds.

100. More recent examples are the Korean and, particularly, Vietnam wars, where initial public support was high, but rapidly deteriorated as the commitment became longer, or in the case of Vietnam, open-ended. An obvious exception to this rule of thumb has been the U.S. commitment to NATO and the stationing of U.S. forces in Korea. In these cases, however, the public appeared willing to spend money, so long as lives were not seriously at risk.

101. As the examples of Kashmir, Cyprus, and the Arabs and Israelis demonstrate.

102. That having been said, U.S. engagement, no matter how well planned or executed, may have little or no influence over the course of events.

103. One, but certainly a pertinent example, are French fears of a mass exodus to France as a result of a radical Islamic group seizing power in Algeria. Currently, 2,500 Algerians are fleeing to France each month. See, Daniel Pipes, "Algerian Time Bomb," *The Washington Post*, August 11, 1994, p. A31; and Alan Riding, "French Bind: Algerian Ties," *The New York Times*, August 10, 1994, p. A5.

104. Examples of congressional attitudes may be found in Marc Fisher, "Europeans Told of U.S. Isolationism," *The Washington Post*, February 10, 1993, p. A1. Views of a senior State Department official, later attributed to Undersecretary to State for Policy Peter Tarnoff, are outlined in Daniel Williams and John M. Goshko, "Reduced U.S. World Role Outlined but Soon Altered," *The Washington Post*, May 26, 1993, p. A1. U.S. military forces have been reduced from roughly 330,000 (1989) to roughly 100,000.

105. Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 8, Chapter 2, p. 579. Clausewitz is discussing "war," but his admonition applies equally as well to ethnic conflict.

106. Although not related to ethnic conflict, the U.S. examples of unclear or disconnected political and military objectives in Korea and Vietnam provide clear examples of the potential problems that will likely result.

107. Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 3, Chapter 1, p. 178.

108. The priority for the ordering these elements is intentional.

109. Because of length constraints the discussion will focus on political and military ways.

110. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, p. 291.

111. "[T]he capacity of territorial restructuring to resolve ethnic tensions should not be overestimated....ethnic boundary lines are rarely clearly drawn." Coakley, "Introduction: The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict," p. 19. See also Jalali and Lipset, "Racial and Ethnic Conflicts: A Global Perspective," p. 602; and Chipman, "Managing the Politics of Parochialism," p. 151.

112. The massive population exchange following the Greco-Turkish War (1923), forced deportations of nationalities in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, expulsion of ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland following World War II, and the exchange of populations that accompanied the partition of the Indian subcontinent (1947) are significant examples.

113. Coakley, "Introduction: The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict," pp. 6-17. See also, Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, pp. 291-304.

114. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, pp. 305-313.

115. Horowitz, "Ethnic Conflict: The Known and the Unknown," p. 30. Or, power-sharing arrangements along ethnic lines could contribute to the fragmentation of political power along ethnic lines. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, pp. 305-313.

116. Benjamin Schwarz, "Ethnic Conflict and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Special Warfare*, forthcoming.

117. Stavenhagen concludes: "In fact, it might be argued, that ethnic conflict as such does not exist. What does exist is social, political, and economic conflict between groups of people who identify each other in ethnic terms: colour, race, religion, language, national origin, etc." Stavenhagen, *The Ethnic Question*, p. 76.

118. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, p. ii.

119. Field Manual (FM) 100-23 (draft), *Peace Operations*, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 22, 1994, p. 1-1.

120. *Ibid.*, p. 1-3.

121. The position of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina in attempting to hold out until U.S. military intervention occurs is a case in point.

122. Thomas Szayna, RAND report, forthcoming.

123. The actions of Bosnian Serb leaders and populace in the face of largely empty UN, NATO, and U.S. threats is an excellent example.

124. FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, p. 1-2.

125. FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, p. 1-5.

126. For example, the United States has long provided a battalion-sized formation as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, and is committed to provide upwards of 25,000 soldiers for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, should U.S. preconditions be met.

127. FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, p. 1-7.

128. *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

129. Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973, pp. xvii-xxiii. Indeed, Weigley's thesis forms the central thread around which he weaves his entire book.

130. For example, as Alexis Heraclides points out, ethnic identity tends to override political and economic considerations. See Heraclides, "Historical and Contemporary Assessment of How States Use Secessionist/Ethnic Movements to Achieve Political Objectives," p. 16.

131. Arnold Kanter, "Intervention Decisionmaking in the Bush Administration: Deciding Where to Go In and When to Get Out," *Special Warfare*, forthcoming.

132. An excellent example of such a proactive policy is the U.S. expenditure of funds for the storage and dismantlement of nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union. Granted, the costs-benefits of such a program may be more readily apparent to the American public than an ethnic conflict in an obscure corner of Europe, but the precedent is there. Policymakers will have to make the appropriate arguments to the American public--no easy task, but a necessary one.

133. For a more detailed discussion of the difficulties inherent in deterring ethnic conflict, see Metz, "Deterring Conflict Short of War."

134. As Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal point out: "An ethnic group fighting for its survival will be willing to pay almost any price and to suffer enormous losses." "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1993, p. 138.

135. Benjamin Schwarz, "Foes Misread US Fear of Casualties," *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 2, 1994, p. 19, takes a differing and interesting view of the casualties and public support issue.

136. An excellent example is the rogue Muslim force of Fikret Abdic that seceded from the centralized control of the Bosnian government, controlled the Bihac area, and allied itself with local Bosnian Serbs.

137. Chipman, "Managing the Politics of Parochialism," p. 146.

138. See Madeleine K. Albright, Anthony Lake, and Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, USA, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," Statements before the Sub-Committee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, May 5, 1994 in *The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management*, Vol. 16, No. 4, Summer 1994, pp. 42-54; and Albright speech, and "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations" [PDD-25], Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, May 1994.

139. The European experience with the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia is an excellent example.

140. The ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia is an excellent example, where President Milosevic of Serbia has done a remarkable job of manipulating the policy differences within the five members of the "contact group" (France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States).

141. Thomas W. Lippman, "U.S. Costs Mounting in Rwanda, Caribbean," *The Washington Post*, August 27, 1994, p. A10; Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Estimates It Will Cost \$427 Million to Invade Haiti," *The New York Times*, September 2, 1994, p. A9; and Paulette V. Walker, "Cuts Stun Commands," *Army Times*, September 5, 1994, p. 26.

142. Dov Zakheim, "Haiti Deployment Has Many Costs," *Defense News*, October 10-16, 1994, p. 23.

143. See, for example, Eric Schmitt, "G.O.P. Military Power Assails Troop Readiness," *The New York Times*, November 17, 1994, p. A22; Bradley Graham and John F. Harris, "Army Readiness Lower Than Reported," *The Washington Post*, November 16, 1994, p. A1; and

"Pentagon: Army Units Not Ready," *Military Newswire Service*, November 16, 1994.

144. PDD-25, pp. 1-3. Indeed, the United States is already militarily involved in ethnic conflict in Europe: Operations SHARP GUARD (maritime enforcement of the UN embargo), DENY FLIGHT (enforcement of the UN "no-fly zone" over Bosnia-Herzegovina), and ABLE SENTRY (preventative deployment to Macedonia) in support of diplomatic efforts to contain and resolve the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia, as well as Operation PROVIDE COMFORT protecting Kurds in Iraq in support of Turkey.

145. For example, the Army can be expected to provide the bulk of the peacekeeping force that President Clinton has pledged to supervise a peace settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which may approach 25,000. See, for example, Thomas E. Ricks, "U.S. Is Preparing to Send Large Force to Bosnia as Peace Agreement Nears," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 24, 1993, p. A12. Later hints from the administration indicate a smaller number (up to one-third of the 50,000 peacekeepers that are estimated to be required). See Elaine Sciolino, "Republicans Say Congress Could Balk on Bosnia Force," *The New York Times*, February 24, 1994, p. A10. Should a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement come about, the U.S. Army could also find itself with substantial numbers of soldiers on the Golan Heights. See Daniel Williams, "Christopher Offers U.S. As Golan Peace Guard," *The Washington Post*, June 16, 1993, p. A26.

146. An obvious example is the current crisis in the Balkans, where the United States, Britain, France, and Germany differ over whether to lift the arms embargo for Bosnia-Herzegovina; and Greece and Turkey have diametrically opposed national interests in the region.

147. While certain basic definitions in FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, Chapter 1, and the NATO Military Committee (MC) Document MC 327, Annex C, agree in large part, there are fundamental substantive differences, for example, in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. For an excellent discussion of differing approaches to peace operations, and a model for future doctrinal development, see Charles Dobbie, "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping," *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 3, Fall 1994, pp. 121-148.

148. See Stanley R. Sloan, "Combined/Joint Task Forces (C/JTF) and New Missions for NATO," CRS Report for Congress, 94-249S, March 17, 1994; Bruce George, MP, "After the NATO Summit," Draft General Report, AL88PC(94)2, Brussels, North Atlantic Assembly, May 1994, pp. 4-5.; "The Jane's Interview," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, September 17, 1994, p. 40; and Carey Schofield, "France as the Wild Card in NATO?," *International Defense Review*, July 1994, pp. 21-22.

149. If recent experience is any guide, U.S. military forces may be faced with hundreds of such organizations.

150. Apparently, such efforts bore fruit during recent humanitarian assistance operations in Rwanda, where NGOs/PVOs and U.S. military personnel functioned amicably and in a synergistic fashion. "After Action Review on Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Rwanda," U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping Institute, October 21, 1994, forthcoming.

151. Paradoxically, as Arnold Kanter points out, if the requisite types and numbers of forces are available for peace operations, national leaders may be more inclined to use the forces. Arnold Kanter, "Intervention Decisionmaking in the Bush Administration," *Special Warfare*, forthcoming.

152. For example, a typical mechanized division contains roughly 17,000 soldiers. However, at most, that unit will be composed of 5 mechanized infantry battalions, each with roughly 850 soldiers, totalling approximately 4,250 personnel. Even within infantry battalions, however, not all personnel are combat infantrymen—mechanics, cooks, medics, etc., make up a considerable proportion. Assuming that every soldier in an infantry rifle or anti-armor company is present for duty as a rifleman, slightly less than 2,500 rifleman would be available for duty. Granted, other soldiers (e.g., engineers, air defenders, etc.) could be employed in a dismounted role, but the numbers would still be substantially reduced from the division total of 17,000. Fewer soldiers would be available if an armored division was employed. Information taken from Student Text 101-1, *Organizational and Tactical Reference Data for the Army in the Field*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1986; and Student Text 101-3, *Selected Tables of Organization*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1986.

153. See Steven Metz, *The Future of the United Nations: Implications for Peace Operations*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 1993, p. 9.

154. For a discussion of training at Fort Polk and a brief overview of outstanding issues, see Bradley Graham, "New Twist for U.S. Troops: Peace Maneuvers," *The Washington Post*, August 15, 1994, p. 1. A longer, more detailed version of the article may be found in Military Newswire Service, August 16, 1994.

155. FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, Appendix C, pp. C-5 to C-8.

156. A number of these issues are drawn from, expanded upon, or adapted from Stofft and Guertner, *Ethnic Conflict*, pp. 14-15.

157. See, for example, NSS; and PDD-25.

158. See, for example, Charles Gati's criticism in "Post-Communist Blues," *The American Enterprise*, Vol. 5, No. 4, July/August 1994, pp. 41-43.

159. NSS, pp. 21-23.

160. Several of the following points are taken or adapted from *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress*, Washington: Government Printing Office, January 1994, pp. 65-66.

APPENDIX A

ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS ANIMOSITIES IN EUROPE AND POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE

REGION/NATION	ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS ISSUE	POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE/ESCALATION
WESTERN EUROPE		
Belgium	Flemings versus Walloons	Low
	Immigrants, mainly from Maghreb	Low
France	Breton separatists	Low
	Corsican separatists	Intermittent terror bombing
	Immigrants, mainly from Maghreb	Moderate—past history of riots
Italy	German minorities in Süd Tyrol/Alto Adige (Austria)	Low
	Italian minorities in Istria (Slovenia/Croatia)	Low
	Slovene minorities (Slovenia)	Low
	Immigrants, especially African, Muslim, and Asian	Low
Netherlands	Immigrants, especially African, Muslim, and Asian	Low
Spain	Basque separatists (ETA)	High—Ongoing terrorism
	Catalan separatists	Low
CENTRAL EUROPE		
United Kingdom	Irish Republican Army	High—Terrorist campaign since 1969
	Scot/Welsh separatists	Low
Austria	German minorities in Süd Tyrol (Italy)	Low
Czech Republic	Sudeten Germans in Czech Republic	Low
	Czech minorities in Croatia	Low
	Slovak minorities in Czech Republic	Low
	Polish minorities in Czech Republic	Low
	Hungarian minorities	Low
	Vietnamese "guest workers" (300,000+)	Low +
Federal Republic of Germany	Non-German immigrants or refugees; racism	High—Recent random violence, harassment ongoing
	Sudeten Germans in Czech Republic	Low
	German minorities in Poland	Low

REGION/NATION	ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS ISSUE	POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE/ESCALATION
Hungary	Hungarian minorities in Czech Republic and Slovakia	Low
	Hungarian minorities in Romania	Low
	Hungarian minorities in Vojvodina	Moderate-high
	Hungarian minorities in Ukraine	Low
Poland	German minorities in Silesia and northeastern Poland	Low
	Polish minorities in Belarus	Low
	Polish minorities in Ukraine and vice versa	Low
Slovak Republic	Slovak minorities in Czech Republic	Low
	Hungarian minorities in Slovakia	Low
	Ukrainian minorities in Slovakia	Low
Switzerland	French-speaking cantons vs. German-speaking cantons vs. Italian-speaking cantons vs. Romanisch ethnic autonomy vs. centralism	Low
SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE		
Albania	Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo (Serbia)	High
	Greek minorities in Albania	High, shootings along frontiers
	Albanian minorities in Greece	Moderate-high
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Albanian minorities in Macedonia	Moderate
	Croatian minorities	High +; ongoing civil war
	Serbian minorities	High +; ongoing civil war
Bulgaria	Macedonian minorities in Bulgaria	Low
	Ethnic Turks	Low, but deportations occurred in 1989
	Ethnic Bulgarians in Serbia	Low-moderate
Croatia	Ethnic Italians in Istria/Dalmatia	Low +
	Ethnic Serbs	High; ongoing fighting
Greece	Ethnic Macedonians in Greece	Low; but high Greek rhetoric
	Greece believes Macedonia may attempt to incorporate Greek Macedonians	Low-moderate
	Ethnic Greeks in Albania and ethnic Albanians in Greece	Low; but high Greek rhetoric
	Turks	Low; but long-standing Turk complaints of discrimination
	Ethnic Bulgarians in Thrace	Low

REGION/NATION	ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS ISSUE	POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE/ESCALATION
Macedonia	Ethnic Bulgars	Low
	Problems with Greece over name "Macedonia"	Low; high Greek rhetoric and economic embargo of Macedonia
Romania	Ethnic Albanians	High +
	Ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania	Low; but Transylvania sparked overthrow of Ceausecu's regime.
	Ethnic Romanians in Moldova	High; civil war has cooled.
	Ethnic Romanians in Ukraine	Low
	Ethnic Ukrainians in Romania	Low
	Ethnic Russians in Romania	Low
	Ethnic Turks in Romania	Low
	Ethnic Slovaks in Romania	Low
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (Serbia/Montenegro)	Ethnic Romanians in Serbia	Low
	Ethnic Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina	High; ongoing war
	Ethnic Serbs in Croatia	High; ongoing war
	Ethnic Serbs in Kosovo	High
	Ethnic Serbs in Macedonia	High
	Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia	High
	Ethnic Bulgarians in Serbia	Low-moderate
	Ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina	Moderate-high
Slovenia	Ethnic Romanians in Serbia	Low
	Ethnic Slovenians in Northern Italy	Low, but demand union with Slovenia
Turkey	Ethnic Turkish minorities in Greece	Low
	Ethnic Turkish minorities in Bulgaria	Low
	Kurds	High; Kurdish Worker's Party (PPK) has waged a violent insurrection since 1983.
	Protection of Muslim minorities in Europe	Low; but rhetoric is rising
	Armenian minorities	Intermittent. Past history of significant strife between Turkey and Armenia. Turkey providing political, economic support to Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey attempting to foster good relations with Armenia.
EASTERN EUROPE		
Belarus	Polish minorities	Low

REGION/NATION	ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS ISSUE	POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE/ESCALATION
Estonia	Russian minorities	Low-moderate
Latvia	Russian minorities	Low-moderate
Lithuania	Russian minorities	Low-moderate
	Polish minorities	Low
Moldova	Russian minorities	Moderate-high. Ceasefire in Trans-Dnester holding
	Ties to Romania	Low-moderate
	Ukrainian minorities	Low
	Gagauzi minorities	Low
Russia	Russian minorities in the "Near Abroad" (i.e., all areas bordering Russia)	Low-moderate Considerable potential to escalate quickly
	Tatars and Tatarstan	Low
	Chechins	High; ongoing civil war
Ukraine	Russian minorities in eastern Ukraine	Low-moderate
	Russian majority in Crimea, but a sizeable Ukrainian minority that is attempting to ally with Crimean Tatars	Moderate-high
	Polish minorities	Low
	Slovak minorities	Low
	Jews	Low
	Hungarian minorities	Low, but very vocal
TRANSCAUCASUS		
Armenia	Nagorno-Karabakh dispute with Azerbaijan	High; ongoing war
Azerbaijan	Dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh	High; ongoing war
Georgia	South Ossetia	High; ongoing civil war
	Abkhazia	High; ongoing civil war

APPENDIX B

SIGNIFICANT ETHNIC MINORITIES IN EUROPE

While this appendix focuses on ethnic minorities within a particular country, several trends deserve particular emphasis. First, because of their past historical and imperial histories, many Western European countries contain a large number of Arabs (predominantly from the Maghreb and Levant), sub-Saharan Africans (Muslim and Christian), and Asians. The economic prosperity of Western Europe reinforced this trend. Second, a considerable Turkish population exists in most West European nations, largely a result of the economic boom of the 1960s-80s that utilized large numbers of "guest workers" who in the ongoing recession in Western Europe may have overstayed their "welcome." Third, since the end of the cold war, significant numbers of Central and Eastern Europeans have sought better economic conditions in Western and Central Europe, further burdening a stretched social welfare system. Finally, the civil war in the former Yugoslavia has resulted in an influx of refugees into Central and Western Europe. Individual ethnic issues within a particular state must be viewed in this context.

COUNTRY	SIGNIFICANT ETHNIC MINORITIES
Albania	Greeks, Vlachs
Armenia	Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Russians
Austria	Croats, Slovenes
Azerbaijan	Armenians, Russians
Belarus	Jews, Poles, Russians, Ukrainians
Belgium	Flemings, Germans, Walloons, Muslims, Turks
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Croats, Serbs, Muslims
Bulgaria	Macedonians, Pomaks (Islamic Slavs), Turks, Vlachs
Croatia	Serbs, Muslims
Czech Republic	Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Slovaks, Ukrainians
Denmark	Germans, Faroe Islanders
Estonia	Germans, Jews, Russians, Ukrainians, Belarussians
Finland	Aaland Islanders (Swedes), Lapps
France	Alsations, Bretons, Corsicans, Muslims, Turks
Georgia	Abkhazis, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Greeks, Kurds, Ossetians, Russians
Germany	Danes, Frisians, Sorbs, Turks, Muslims
Greece	Albanians, Macedonians, Turks, Vlachs
Gypsies (Roma)	Austria (19,000), Belgium (20,000), Bulgaria (475,000), Czech Republic/Slovakia (410,000), Denmark (4,500), Eire (18,000), Finland (8,000), France (260,000), Germany (84,000), Greece (140,000), Hungary (560,000), Italy (120,000), Netherlands (40,000), Portugal (105,000), Romania (760,000), Spain (745,000), Sweden (15,000), Switzerland (35,000), former USSR (500,000), United Kingdom (90,000), former Yugoslavia (850,000) [Total: 5,333,500]
Hungary	Czechs, Germans, Slovaks

Italy	Albanians, Germans, Croats, Friulians, Greeks, Ladins, Sardinians, Sicilians, Slovenes, Trentines, French
Latvia	Germans, Jews, Russians, Belarussians, Ukrainians, Poles, Lithuanians
Lithuania	Germans, Jews, Poles, Russians, Belarussians, Ukrainians
Macedonia	Albanians, Turks, Serbs, Romany, Muslims
Moldova	Gagauz, Jews, Romanians, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Jews
Norway	Lapps
Poland	Germans, Ukrainians
Portugal	Azoreans, Madeirans, Africans
Romania	Germans, Hungarians, Ukrainians
Russia (European)	Ukrainians, Chivasu, Bashkirs, Belarussians, Mordirvions, Chechens, Greeks, Tatars, Germans
Serbia/Montenegro	Albanians, Croats, Macedonians, Muslims, Hungarians, Romany
Slovenia	Croats, Serbs, Italians
Spain	Basques, Catalans, Galicians, Gibraltarians, Cuettans and Melillans (enclaves in North Africa)
Sweden	Lapps
Switzerland	French, German, Italian, Romantsch
Turkey	Armenians, Greeks, Kurds
Ukraine	Cossacks, Crimean Tatars, Jews, Russians, Belarussians, Moldavians
United Kingdom	Gaels (Scots), Irish, Welsh

Sources: Minority Rights Group, *World Directory of Minorities*, Chicago: St. James Press, 1989, *passim*; Ted R. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993, pp. 210-215; and Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook*, 1992, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992, Map 6, "Ethnic Groups in Eastern Europe."

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1991 and currently serves as an Associate Research Professor of National Security Affairs. He has also held the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies of the U.S. Army War College since 1994. An infantry officer before retiring from the U.S. Army, Dr. Johnsen served in a variety of troop leading, command and staff assignments in the 25th Infantry Division and 7th Infantry Division (Light). He also served as Assistant Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy, and as an Arms Control Analyst in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Dr. Johnsen holds a B.S. degree from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.A. and Ph.D. in history from Duke University, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He has authored or coauthored numerous Strategic Studies Institute studies, as well as articles in a variety of policy journals that focus on U.S.-European security issues.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

**Major General Richard A. Chilcoat
Commandant**

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

**Acting Director
Colonel William W. Allen**

**Director of Research
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.**

**Author
Dr. William T. Johnsen**

**Editor
Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling**

**Secretary
Ms. Rita A. Rummel**

**Composition
Mrs. Mary Jane Semple**

**Cover Artist
Mr. James E. Kistler**